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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Survey of Britain

ALAN RICHARDSON

Industrial Change

W. G. SYMONS

Reconstruction

MICHAEL DEAN

Planning and Democracy

EDUARD HEIMANN

Fall 1941

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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Contents

EDITORIALS:	PAGE
The Aftermath	1
Lessons from Russian Resistance.....	3
Taxation and Defense Economy.....	4
Britain's Atonement	5
Our British Issue.....	7
THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN WAR-TIME BRITAIN, by ALAN RICHARDSON.....	8
INDUSTRY UNDER CHANGE, by W. G. SYMONS.....	18
RECONSTRUCTION IN GREAT BRITAIN TODAY, by MICHAEL DEAN....	27
PLANNING AND DEMOCRACY, by EDUARD HEIMANN	34
BOOK REVIEWS	40

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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EDITORIALS

The Aftermath

There are isolationists who think all could be well if only America could avoid involvement in the war. There are interventionists who are equally sanguine about the future if only Hitler is defeated. Anthony Eden, among British statesmen, has the habit, for instance, of picturing the nice free world which will emerge almost automatically upon Hitler's defeat.

The real situation is that without the defeat of the Nazis the world will sink into an almost universal slavery, and that the defeat of the Nazis will not guarantee a nice new world. Even if the international problem is solved and a genuine federation of nations, compatible with the interdependence of a technical age, is created, the domestic problem which will face the Western nations will be tremendous. A slight measure of that problem is given by the fact, that even before and without entering the war, we have spent more on our military and naval establishment in the past 18 months than we spent during the entire world war, and our national debt is more than double the debt left us by the last war. Some months ago the British secretary of war estimated that mechanization has increased the expenditure per soldier to five times that incurred in the world war. The impoverishment of

the world after the war will be beyond present calculation. If even the wealthiest nations will feel the pinch of poverty, the plight of both Germany and the subject nations, which she has plundered and robbed, can hardly be imagined. Furthermore, there will be a great ethnic chaos, caused by the Nazi effort to exterminate the Jews and the Poles, and by the vast forced migrations which have been a part of Nazi politics.

However the chaos of our time is estimated, we are living in a period comparable to the decay of feudalism, except that the decay of a technical civilization with its vast international complexities is more terrible than the decay of a comparatively self-sufficient agrarian feudal economy. More specifically our period conforms to that of the thirty-years war. We can hardly expect a less tragic aftermath than that which followed this terrible civil war in Europe.

Living in such a period, it is well to avoid all simple panaceas or to drug the imagination with simple hopes. No doubt there will be thousands who have no real contact with political realities or understanding of political alternatives, who will say after the war: Did we not tell you that it would be terrible if we allowed ourselves to be involved in war? They are like people who would accuse firemen of gutting a building with water in order to put out a fire. The site of a fire ruins is never a pretty pic-

ture. Frequently the water seems to have done as much havoc as the fire. Only, one must not forget what the alternative might have been if the fire had not been put out.

It is not wrong to call attention to the fact that the war has prompted certain gains in the democratic cause within the warring nations. In Britain some of the last vestiges of feudal privilege are falling. As the wealth of a nation diminishes, privileges must either be maintained by the abrogation of the democratic process, or the general standard of justice inherent in a democracy forces the diminution of privilege. On the whole, Britain's democratic health has been great enough to prompt a development toward more equality; and one may hope that our residual health is great enough to produce the same result.

However, some things are possible under the pressure of a fight for survival which are not so easy when the pressure is removed. The social struggle within each nation, "frozen" for the duration of the war by the necessity of meeting a common peril, will express itself again when the pressure of war is removed. It need not break out violently. Whether it does or not, depends upon the degree of social and economic health and statesmanlike wisdom within each nation. But it is impossible to destroy as much wealth as this war is destroying, without making the distribution of what remains a more pressing problem than before. Unjust privileges are always more sufferable, or at least they are actually suffered, when the total social fund is large enough to permit them without too glaring a penury at the bottom. But they become intolerable when they so

obviously cause unbearable privations. To a certain degree, the pressure of a general poverty will persuade the privileged to accept new social demands voluntarily. But one never knows to what degree this is possible. All privileges have a way of becoming transmuted into "rights" through history; and these rights are stubbornly, sometimes hysterically defended. That is why the social struggle in every modern nation will be fought more desperately after the war than now.

It is highly probable that the modern world will solve its international problem, difficult as that is, more easily than its social-domestic problem. The war has so obviously reduced both international anarchy and international tyranny to absurdities, that a sober and chastened world may well be able to set up a more democratic international order. It will be much more difficult to reorganize each nation's internal economy so that it will be compatible with the necessities of a technical age and with the requirements of a humane justice.

All these speculations and prophecies may seem irrelevant while the victory of tyranny is still a possibility, and while it is certain that its final defeat will require many sacrifices not yet made. Yet, it is becoming fairly clear that the German tyranny is so lacking in minimal justice that, whatever its military victories, it will not be able to organize a stable Europe; certainly not, if any bastions of its enemies remain standing.

For this reason, it is as important to plan for the future of a democratic world as to insure that there will be such a future. In making these plans, we must give ourselves neither to de-

air nor to false hopes. It is idle to imagine that the war will automatically wipe out all past evils and allow us to build a new and lovely world. It is worse than idle to succumb to cynicism and abandon our civilization to its doom. The Kingdom of God is always "like unto a householder who bringeth forth out of his treasures things new and old." Some ancient evils will be destroyed by the war. Some will be accentuated by it. The self-sufficiency of nations will be finally destroyed; but vindictive passions will complicate the problem of achieving a new justice. Certain gains toward equality will be made almost automatically; but the achievements of liberty will be more difficult.

Living in such a world it behooves us to act "not as fools but as wise, redeeming the time because the days are evil."

Lessons from Russian Resistance

Most of the enemies of Germany agreed with the German general staff before Russia was invaded. They assumed that the German army would make short shrift of Russian resistance. It was believed that the Russian could not match German efficiency, and that their resources in everything but manpower would not avail to do more than momentarily halt the Germans.

A war of three months is not long enough to justify final conclusions. But it has been long enough to prove most of us wrong in regard to Russia. The difference between Russian resistance and French collapse is so glaring that it will force us to reexamine many of our fondest prejudices.

What is the basis of the Russian strength? Is it a Russian quality which has nothing to do with communism?

None of us have known for decades just what was to be regarded as Russian, and what as communistic in Russia. We did not know whether to attribute the inefficiency of industry to the one or the other factor? We were not certain whether the tyranny was the remnant of Asiatic tyranny, or the inevitable fruit of a Marxist dictatorship. We cannot be certain even now. In the same way, we are not certain whether the Russian will to live is something primarily derived from sources of uncorrupted vitality in the Russian heart, or whether it is primarily communist.

The fact that Stalin did not appeal to communist presuppositions at all in his final appeal after the invasion, but called upon the people to defend their hearths and homes, and indulged in purely nationalistic arguments, suggests that the sources of Russian resistance are primarily Russian rather than communist.

But even if this is true, it cannot be denied that collective ownership has given Russia one advantage which the so-called democratic nations have lacked. No private interest has been allowed to impede the war effort. The Dnieper dam could be dynamited when strategy demanded it. Would it have been possible to do this if it had been owned by a powerful and influential group in a democratic capitalistic country? It is, of course, rather sad that this freedom of a commonwealth from the distractions of private interest should be put to its primary test in war. Nevertheless, it is a test. The Russian communists may be too dogmatic in their collectivism, just as Marxism in general may regard the social ownership of productive means as too exclusively the panacea for all social ills. It is, never-

theless, a fact that social ownership is a gain, and that Russia is the first nation which has been able to match the "all out" character of the German effort, precisely because private interest has been subordinated to the nation in the same way, or even more rigorously.

This does not mean that the social ownership of property may not be bought at too high a price if either the Russian or the German tyranny are the price. We must seek a way of establishing the same gains without paying so high a price. But when one sees to what degree the defense effort is hampered at every turn in America by the quest for profits, one must gratefully record this clear lesson of history which Russia teaches.

Nothing that Russia has done, can obscure the fact that it is really a tyranny, and that vexations of arbitrary rule have been as grievous in Russia as in Germany. Some of us expected that the weaknesses of morale, which are the inevitable concomitants of the tyrannical unification of the social order, would make it impossible for the Russians to carry on. But that was hardly logical since the Germans are as much, or more, the victims of tyranny as the Russians; and they have not suffered from lack of morale up to this point. They may suffer in the end. Joseph Harsch in his "Pattern of Conquest" shows very clearly where the ultimate weakness of a totalitarian morale lies, and why it requires time for history to reveal that weakness.

In other words, if there is a weakness in the Russian armor at this point, as there probably is, it would hardly reveal itself earlier than in Germany. And the Russians have the advantage of the Germans here, by the year and a half

of warfare which the Germans have conducted before the Russians were attacked. Thus the Russians may be able to survive their basic weakness because their enemy suffers from the same ailment and has, moreover, been subjected to a longer strain.

Taxation and Defense Economy

While the taxation program before Congress is better than it might have been, it is not as good as it should be. The taxation on excess profits is far below that achieved in Britain, and does not remove the possibility of profiteering or growing rich through defense expenditures. The emphasis upon lowering exemptions on income tax has been justified by the wrong reasons, and is not the best method of accomplishing its purpose. The purpose of taxation in the lower income brackets is not primarily to increase revenues. The primary purpose must be to keep consumer demand down so that excessive demand will not lead to skyrocketing prices and inflation.

The situation is that, as the workers are increasingly employed in the defense industry and begin to draw good wages, the buying power of the country is materially increased. But the productive power of the country for consumer goods is materially decreased by the necessity of producing defense materials. Thus the pressure of demand on diminishing supplies leads to higher and higher prices. Taxation of income could effect this situation, only if the tax were paid in the year that it is earned. The only other alternative is a sales tax, which accomplishes the purpose of avoiding inflation with greater certainty than any other form of taxation, but which is, on the other hand,

ch more likely to work an injustice on the poor. They are already heavily taxed by this method in various states. It will be remembered that the depression brought a perfect epidemic of sales taxes in states and municipalities. They are all justified as emergency taxes. The critics of such taxation predicted the time, that, once adopted, they could never be repealed. These prophecies proved correct.

The present taxation program leaves the higher middle class in the most advantageous position. Though the income taxes in the \$5,000 to \$10,000 group have been multiplied many times, this class is still able to make larger consumer demands upon our economy than the supply will permit.

It is not a simple matter to work out a taxation program which will be both equitable, and efficacious, which will place the common burden of national defense upon the various income groups according to their ability to bear it, and which will yet restrict consumption effectively. There is a certain degree of incompatibility between these two objectives, because the consuming power of the masses, while limited individually, is still the overwhelming factor in the total consumer demand. It is not possible, in other words, to prevent inflation by cutting luxury expenditures alone. Expenditures, for what any ordinary family has the right to regard as necessity, must be cut. The alternative, "guns or butter," contains a measure of truth, despite its odious origin. Perhaps the best solution of this problem is forced savings. If workers with higher incomes than before, were required to save a portion of it, so that the demands for consumer goods would not cause inflation, the primary

purpose of avoiding inflation would be served without injustice.

It is surprising, incidentally, that both labor and liberal circles have been so comparatively inactive while these problems have been discussed. Social justice will depend increasingly upon taxation schedules in coming years. It will become our business, increasingly, to acquaint ourselves with both the economic and ethical implications of taxation policy.

Britain's Atonement

France's fall was such a shock to the world that practically everybody including the French, the Nazis, and most of ourselves, believed the British would not survive it. Yet, after a year Britain still stands. Her resistance has been, and continues to be, the core and lifeblood of whatever hope there is. It seems to be overshadowed, at times, by more sensational events in distant theatres of war; but it nourishes the struggle everywhere. It is not adequately described as heroism, or martyrdom, let alone as imperialistic will, or what other absurdities, and calumnies may serve to disparage it. It can best be understood by contrasting it with the development of German morale.

As the German soldiers heaped victory on victory, they became more and more depressed, and saddened. From Scandinavia, from the Lowlands, from France all witnesses agree on this point. For victorious soldiers in the gayest city of the world to be melancholy and depressed, is as abnormal as is the British cheer in the midst of the ordeal. But, it is no less intelligible. Each one of these victories removes the German soldiers farther from victory and peace, and increases the burden of their guilt

and their fear of the final accounting. For the means, diplomatic and military, with which these successive victories are won, make a peace which would be acceptable to the overrun peoples and the world at large, more and more impossible. And what shall become of the German soldiers once all these tortured peoples rise, the Poles and Czechs, the Norwegians and Dutch, the Serbs and Greeks, and the French and Italians? There is a God in heaven.

While Britain is no more than any other nation of the sin of self-righteousness, it is nevertheless true that a deep sense of contrition over past failures pervaded the country at the outbreak of the war. With the fall of France, and the tremendous air attacks of last fall and winter, Britain experienced something of the sense of atonement. That is the explanation of the cheer and friendliness, the rich cockney humor, and the good morale of Britain through these trying months. The ordeal by fire had purged the conscience.

British atonement unites in itself the two elements of the fight against Hitlerism, external and internal, international and domestic, military and moral. Whatever the special roots of Hitlerism in the German tradition, its growth into a world menace is only the reflection and symptom of the general corruption of the democracies. Hence we cannot hope to conquer Hitler unless we make ourselves new. And even if we could conquer without repentance, we would immediately be up against another brand of the evil, another reflection of our corruption. On the other hand, it is too late to concentrate exclusively on the domestic issue of reforming ourselves, as the French Popular Front and many an honest American democrat

would have it. For the evil is rampant now and its external incorporation in Hitler would crush Britain and ourselves as it did crush French democracy. We have to cut out the cancer at the same time that we have to struggle for a remedy to prevent its growth elsewhere. We have to atone for our sins by fighting the evil within ourselves and without, for it is basically one.

Nations, as nations, cannot achieve the depths of self-examination and the heights of a new and forgiven life, which is possible for individuals. Nevertheless, there are national experiences which are analogous to the best in the spiritual history of individual man. Whatever the sins of British "cant", whatever the evils of imperialism, whatever the errors of omission, the hope, for instance, that the continent could perish in anarchy while Britain remained secure, errors in which our own nation is still engulfed, all these have certainly been atoned for to a very great degree by the resolute courage of the British people. The fate which now makes them the chief guardians of the liberties of other nations, and which prompts the subject peoples to look forward to a British victory, as their one great hope, is in a sense the revelation of the divine mercy which follows contrition.

There are, of course, no perfect conversions for either nations or individuals and no guarantees that past sins may not be repeated. But the American critics who carp over British errors are obviously prompted more by their own bad conscience, than by the realities. The greatest unhappiness is derived from an uneasy conscience, which is not fully conscious of itself, and which is not ready to move from despair to

penitance. The cheapest way of covering up this uneasiness is by criticism of others. It is particularly cheap when the critic lives in physical ease and spiritual torment, while the object of his criticism lives in physical terror and spiritual peace.

Our British Issue

This issue is in effect a British one,

with all the main articles devoted to a survey of religious, industrial and political conditions in Britain. The authors are all close to the position of the Fellowship and belong to our circle of British readers. We are grateful for the thoroughness with which they have surveyed the British situation for the benefit of our American readers.

THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN WAR-TIME BRITAIN

By ALAN RICHARDSON

The task of writing about the British religious and theological situation in war-time is difficult, because all that one can do is to try to sense an atmosphere, to convey an impression; and therefore the result must necessarily be rather personal and subjective, containing things with which other observers might disagree. When one remembers the difficulties of printing and publishing at the present time, the remarkable thing is that so many theological books have appeared since the beginning of the war; but it is not with theology in the academic sense that we are here concerned: those who are interested in British theology in this sense may still read "Theology," the "Expository Times" or the "Journal of Theological Studies." The purpose of this article is more nebulous: to try to convey an impression of the religious situation (using the word in a wide sense) and of the chief influence upon the movements of Christian opinion in this country at the present time.

During the war of 1914-18 the most urgent religious problem was: How can a God of love permit the horrors of war and the consequent sufferings of the innocent? The idea of the "suffering God" was prominent, and G. A. Studdert-Kennedy expressed the religious mood of the people exactly. Today the atmosphere has changed: the problem of evil is still, (and presumably always will be), a question which commands attention, and Mr. C. S. Lewis's

remarkably lucid little book "The Problem of Pain" (Centenary Press) is being widely read; it is interesting to compare its standpoint with that of Studdert-Kennedy. But the problem of suffering is not now the beginning and the end of theological discussion. The general mood seems to recognize an even harder problem: if there exists a God of righteousness at all, how could Europe hope to escape the penalties of its follies and crimes? The liberal attitude, for which the problem of suffering was the great stumbling-block, has been dissolved in the years between the wars and by acids of the biblical realism as well as by the logic of events, and the beginning of the present war found a number of leaders talking about "God's Judgment on Europe," (the title of A. R. Vidler's book in which this point of view was clearly stated), and referring to Hitler, (and sometimes Stalin!), as the rod of God's anger and the instrument of correction in His hand. During the long, dark winter of waiting which preceded the spring offensive of 1940, when a sense of foreboding filled the air, there was a tendency to find relief in such a theology of doom: it seemed to fit our mood.

But that mood has changed with the rapidly changing events of the months which followed the flare-up on the western front. The point of view is swinging from a meek acceptance of Hitler as God's judgment on Europe and on ourselves, (frequently branded

the less sensitive as "defeatist"), to serious questioning about the fate of the instrument of correction itself. The situation is described in almost contemporary terms in the book of Habbakuk; the prophet began with an acceptance of the Chaldean peril as God's chastisement of His people's sins, but a closer acquaintance with the actual cruelties and motives of the invaders soon brought him to turn his attention to the other problem—that of God's judgment upon His own instrument of punishment, which had not recognized the appointed limits of its purpose. The book of Habbakuk is well worth studying just now. This changing mood is expressed in a remark which a well-known leader amongst the Free Churches passed in my hearing the other day: "I am getting rather tired of all this talk of Hitler as God's judgment on us; why doesn't somebody start a theory about Mr. Churchill as God's judgment on Hitler?" That casual remark may not perhaps carry the matter even as far as Habbakuk did, and Habbakuk did not entirely answer his own question; but it is at least indicative of a changing mood. Perhaps we will soon strike the right balance of good, in which a recognition of our own share in the guilt of war will not inhibit our resolution to wipe the terror, which we helped to create, from the face of the earth.

Of course, these remarks apply only to general trends, or moods, discernible in the kind of things which are now being said by religious speakers and writers. There exist side by side with them other tendencies which take quite different directions. There are those, for example, who have never accepted the idea of God's judgment, and who

assert that it is just a morbid mood produced by the darkness of the political and international scene, and that it will pass. "John Hadham", the author of that notable Penguin book "Good God", is an example of those younger and unrepentant liberals, who are inclined to treat a good deal of what some of us would call biblical theology as a surrender to the forces of darkness which now oppress Europe. But, although the personal influence of such vital personalities as "John Hadham" is undoubtedly great, I do not notice that any considerable body of Christian opinion is swinging back in the direction of liberalism in theology. Yet, these protests are valuable in providing a warning against any undue excess of "Barthianism".

The British rarely push an idea to its logical conclusion, and as a result they tend to avoid extremes. This makes it difficult to classify types of theological outlook, because they all tend to merge into one another, and to regard one another as complementary aspects of the truth. In particular we have never become very excited about what is sometimes called "ideology". Ideological controversies do not fascinate us. Since the outbreak of the war there has been a marked decline in ideological speculation, as the Archbishop of York has noted in summarising his impressions of a recent visit to Cambridge: "there is a weakening of that rigid classification into Left and Right, which was preventing either from illuminating the other. Instead there is a readiness, even an eagerness, under the pressure of these urgent days, to consider what can be done fairly soon to make some real advance towards a more just social and international order: people

of different general views are prepared to join together in discussing practical steps". The Nazi-Communist pact with which the war began served to confirm the British suspicion of ideologies, and the recent attack of Hitler upon his old friend Stalin has merely helped to make the "ideologists" look even more silly in the eyes of most people in this country. Strange things happen nowadays, which make our ideologists stand on their head in an endeavor to see things their own way up, and the normal Britisher finds the spectacle rather diverting. It is impossible to generalize about things: who would have imagined that the first serious public attack upon the existing libel laws and their abuse would have been made by one of the "lords spiritual" in the Upper House of Parliament? Yet, this is what happened when the Bishop of Birmingham raised again the question of the "cement ring" in the House of Lords, where he could claim parliamentary privilege for his utterance, after he had been fined a large sum of money, when he refused to defend himself against the charge of libel which had been brought against him in the courts.

It is very difficult for one who is not a pacifist to give a fair summary of the standpoint of pacifists in Britain today. One possible false impression might be conveyed by the disproportionate amount of space which is devoted to the subject in this article—disproportionate, that is to say, in relation to the numerical size of the pacifist minority. In order to correct that possible misunderstanding at the outset we might point out that in the last registration, (that of men born in 1901), there were only 1,000 conscientious objectors out of the 280,000

men who registered on May 31, 1941—i.e., a mere 0.36 of the total. But Christians, of all people, ought to know that an idea's worth is not to be assessed by the simple process of counting heads; Bishop Gore used to remark upon the evidence of the Old Testament concerning the divine contempt for majorities. Ideas are worth looking at for their own sake.

While it is not true to say that all Christian pacifists are theological liberals, or that Christian pacifism cannot stand upon any other basis than that of liberal theology, it nevertheless remains true to say that most Christian pacifists in Britain today are liberals. A good proportion of that minority of young men of fine Christian character and high Christian ideals who have resolutely taken their stand for conscience' sake before the tribunals are, of course, entirely unaware of what liberalism is; so completely has the liberal outlook dominated their minds that they have entirely identified "the simple Gospel" with Christianity itself; they would be genuinely shocked to discover that their confident faith is a comparatively modern aberration from the mainstream of classical Christian thought. It is not, however, with them that we are concerned, however we may sympathize with them in their predicament and admire their moral courage. Our interest at the moment lies rather with those who consciously affirm Christian liberalism in theology, having fully understood its implications. A few years ago I remember hearing one of the leading pacifists in this country, and one of our leading liberal theologians, a Professor of Divinity, remark that nearly all the theology written between Origen and Frederick Dennison Maurice was on

the wrong track! I will not mention his name since he was speaking, (as I believe is said in America), "off the records", and he might perhaps wish to qualify the statement; but the remark neatly illustrates the liberal attitude. Anyone who attempts to discuss the pacifist issue with Christian young people, brought up in the churches, soon becomes aware of the extent to which the rarified liberalism of the modern pulpit has successfully inoculated them against any real appreciation of the depth of the biblical message; and to some of us it would even appear that this is the real "betrayal of Christ by the Churches". (In this regard Mr. Middleton Murry lives in a glass house and should not throw stones.) On the other hand, it should be said that the temper of thoughtful young people is by no means liberal, and few of them are content with the view (if they stop to consider it) that the Kingdom of heaven is the natural outcome or goal of the processes of history, to be brought in by the gradual acceptance of the Sermon on the Mount and the improvement of our social, scientific and educational techniques.

The leadership of Christian pacifism in this country is on the whole undoubtedly liberal; one thinks of such names as those of Professor C. E. Raven, the Bishop of Birmingham (Dr. Barnes), J. Leyton Richards or the late Canon R. L. ("Dick") Sheppard himself, the founder of the Peace Pledge Union. There are, of course, pacifist theologians like Professor C. H. Dodd of Cambridge, who are certainly not liberals; none has done more than Dr. Dodd to instruct our generation in the real meaning of biblical eschatology or the

New Testament idea of the Kingdom of God; but it is probably true to say that his theological position is not understood or appreciated by most Christian pacifists. Perhaps that is why such leaders concentrate more upon the teaching of a sound biblical theology than upon the propagation of pacifist ideas; they seem to think—though I am not speaking here specifically of Dr. Dodd—that their most useful contribution in the present phase of things is to preach the Gospel and to see that it is understood by those whom they can effectively reach.

Perhaps from our present point of view the most interesting group is a small number of younger parsons and laymen who, rejecting theological liberalism and accepting an orthodox (Reformed or biblical) theology, nevertheless maintain a pacifist position. The spokesman of this group is the Rev. Alexander Miller, an English Presbyterian minister who works in the East End of London, and edits a diminutive but stimulating monthly magazine called "The Presbyter". This "unofficial monthly" is published for ministers by ministers, and, although still in its infancy, has stimulated some keen discussion and frank heart-searching about the Christian message in a world at war. The biblical standpoint which it adopts endeavors to take the Old Testament as seriously as the New Testament takes it. The Christian is a citizen of two worlds, who stands with other men in the effort to secure justice against injustice, and "over against other men in a constant act of witness that no approximation to justice is an approach to the kingdom of God . . . and that every human order is under the judgment of the Divine Order and the

Heavenly Law". A Tolstoian pacifism which makes violence or non-violence an absolute criterion of all social behavior is heretical. For this group pacifism is a political judgment: they accept the Reformed faith, and are "pacifists, not because we want to take a short cut to the Kingdom of God or believe we already live there, but because as citizens of twentieth century Europe trying to end tyranny and secure justice, we see no possibility of such a result following from the use of war." Force is a futile instrument with which to exercise the evil which springs from the heart of society itself. Nor does this group wish to "buy a respite (from war) with the dubious coin of Munich" or to assert that to seek a "negotiated peace" at the present time is the specifically Christian way. Christian citizenship might even compel the acceptance of the duty of revolution for the sake of true order which embodies justice. With the validity of this political judgment we are not here concerned—we should like to see this group work out its political scheme as carefully as it has considered its theological position—but it is interesting to notice the existence of a pacifist group which is aware that "theological liberalism has very little reply to make when the big guns of Barth and Niebuhr are thundering an anti-pacifist broadside."

The position of this group has received its clearest expression in a pamphlet recently written by Alexander Miller entitled "The Irrelevance of Pure Pacifism" (obtainable from P. Wilson, 33, Townsend Drive, St. Albans, England), price 3d. In it he criticizes the Peace Pledge Union on the grounds that a mere rejection of war is not sufficient to constitute the basis of a

socially effective society; the original aim of the P.P.U., to stop war by sheer weight of numbers, having now failed, "the organized pacifist movement must either accept the necessity of radical transformation or go into well-deserved extinction." The writer finds himself closer to many men in khaki than to many of his fellow pacifists who would buy peace at the expense of fascism. Pacifism is for him an integral phase of the age-long struggle for a just and stable society, and the immediate question appears to him to be which social group is going to control industry, finance and so on; Hitlerism is only a symptom of the need for that control to pass into other hands, and to aim merely at destroying Hitlerism is to fight against the shadow rather than the substance. Most of us will probably disagree with Mr. Miller's political judgment at this point. But the interesting feature is that there exists a group of "Reformed" theologians which, like the Marxists and near-Marxists, possesses a penetrating insight into the nature of contemporary social issues and yet is curiously defective in making a political judgment, and for the same reasons! What the effect of the attack upon Russia will be upon the thinking of this group, it is too early to say.

The unfavorable reaction of the P.P.U. to this line of criticism is expressed in a leading article in "Peace News", (May 9, 1941). The article is unsigned, but one may surmise that its author is Mr. Middleton Murry. It suggests that "to judge from a recent resolution of the National Council a majority of the P.P.U. believes that a negotiated peace would clear the ground for creative pacifist action." "The pacifist demand for a negotiated peace now

not a demand for a just peace. It is primarily a demand for a cessation of war at all costs, at any cost." That, must be admitted, is a point of view, and it has the merit of plain speaking, but it does not commend itself to British people, Christian or non-Christian, I say.

On this question of "peace by negotiation" Mr. Miller is emphatic: such a policy, he says, becomes suspect when we see that it can have no appeal to the masses among ordinary men. "The groups to whom it will appeal are the sentimental, the fearful and the pro-Nazi... the 'peace by negotiation' policy has no appeal to any typical British crowd. Take it, for example, into a large East London district. There is bewilderment and little or no comprehension of the social causes and results of war. The characteristic war-motive is a stolid 'We can't have that there 'Itler 'ere'. The only groups that would respond to a 'peace' policy towards Hitlerism would be an odd bunch of fascists and the very timid among the rest. The people who would lynch you would be the backbone of the community. And this is worth thinking on: for if we must get lynched, let's not get lynched by the wrong folk."

Mr. Miller's quotation of the phrase "we can't have that Hitler here" adequately sums up the position of public opinion as a whole. In moments of religious exaltation or in moods of moral earnestness the British public comforts itself with the reflection that we are fighting for a better social order, for democratic liberties and for the rights of small nations. It likes to hear from the pulpit or radio that its energies are being well spent in the interests of world-peace and freedom—provided

that the speaker does not lay on the butter too thick, in which case there is generally a tendency to nausea. But the really solid motive which unites almost everybody is that we don't want Hitler, or his Gestapo, or his methods, over here; the public has unerringly sensed danger, and the instinctive reaction is that of self-preservation. We don't like Hitler; his achievements menace our freedom; we do not trust his promises and, therefore, are not inclined to negotiate. That is the beginning and end of the matter. There might be a dash of truth in the view that we are fighting for liberty for others and for a better world all around, and this is always a comfortable thing to be told when we switch on the radio at the end of the day's work; but moral idealism is not the motive behind our fighting. Other nations say that we are hypocritical, that we so easily discover high moral principles to justify our self-interested actions, and this may well be true; at any rate, it is pretty obvious that the high moral principles were an afterthought this time. Blessed is the nation whose path of duty coincides with its self-interest—it is about its only chance of doing right! If we are doing right, and are really fighting the world's battle for freedom, we are not, I think, in great danger, as a nation, of persuading ourselves that we are fighting solely for others without a thought for ourselves. Sometimes this suggestion is made by speakers and writers who conceive it to be their duty to keep up "morale", but the average Briton has now developed quite a strong propaganda-resistance. British propaganda has been so mild, and administered in such small doses, that it has merely served as a kind of inoculation,

with the result that the British blood has now developed vigorous anti-toxin qualities which successfully resist all the cruder forms of propaganda. Listening to the Sunday evening "post-script" after the nine o'clock news is a kind of game, in which one carefully counts the points made by either side. But how harmless and good-natured our little talks or our pink sermons are, and what a valuable lightning conductor they make against the real thing! It is sometimes said that the British have not yet mastered the art of propaganda, and there is something in this; there is still an old-fashioned prejudice in favor of facts as more stimulating than any propaganda, however unpalatable they are; a good deal of Mr. Churchill's popularity rests on the general confidence that he will not conceal the dangers and difficulties of the situation, and that he makes no rosy promises and offers no prizes.

On the whole, it is true to say that the worst excesses of a war-mentality have not yet appeared among us. There is little public out-cry for air-raid reprisals, and "bomb-Berlin" candidates lose their deposit. Conscientious objectors are tolerated, (to the annoyance of a few of them), with good humor. The knowledge that one might be prosecuted for spreading "despair and despondency" does not seem to have inhibited criticism upon the question of (for example) Crete. Refugees are treated with sympathy and they do not need police protection if they speak German in the street! Occasionally the propagandists seem to think it necessary to appeal to lower motives, as when they exhibit posters urging people to "Get their own back" with Defense Bonds, illustrating their point with the

picture of a handsome red bomb. But on the whole, this kind of thing seems to fall rather flat. The bombing of Germany is looked upon rather as a regrettable necessity, than as a chance of getting one's own back, even by people in the worst-hit areas. How far is the Christian faith and life today bearing fruit, after centuries of toil, in the formation of a reasonably decent standard of values amongst a much-suffering people in war-time? That we cannot tell; but in the general recognition that Britain herself is not without blame for her share in the making of the present situation, in the critical disdain of propaganda and the widespread dislike of such expressions as "crusade", "righteous war", etc., in the calm acceptance of suffering as an inevitable consequence of past negligencies and sins, in the awakening desire for social justice—in all these things it is possible to detect, if not a sound Christian faith of any conscious or explicit kind, at least something which may be described as Christian common-sense!

In his scholarly little book in the Christian News-Letter Series "War—What does the Bible Say?" Dr. J. R. Coates shows how the great periods of creative prophecy and of social or national reconstruction were the periods of crisis, of war or revolution. "In each of these epochs war played its part, but at the heart of the struggle there worked a spiritual force which found expression in a program of social betterment and religious advance, thus providing a good example of Matthew Henry's saying, 'Times of war should be times of reformation'". It is true that war presents opportunities which do not arise in periods of stability; the necessity of securing a maximum of

efficiency, of cooperative effort and social unity, renders possible changes in the social and industrial sphere which would require years of peace-time evolution. Such changes are going on in Britain today, that it is almost impossible to assess the significance of what is happening. The real question is, is there a spiritual force at the heart of the struggle, which is finding its expression in social betterment and religious advance? Time alone can answer this question, since it is by its fruits that we shall have to judge. Is this spiritual force sufficiently Christian to produce the right kind of reformation in our national life, and is it sufficiently strong to survive after the bombs have ceased to fall, and sustain the effort which has been begun under pressure of war? Or are we just one more example of: "The Devil was sick, the Devil a saint was he . . ."? A consideration of what happened after the last war is rather sobering.

The signs of the times are not, however, by any means depressing. The Malvern Conference is one symptom of the existence of a social conscience, inchoate perhaps but vigorous, even amongst the more exalted ranks of Anglicanism. The publication of "Putting our House in Order" (Longmans 5/6d.) with its impressive list of signatories bears witness to the growing demand for economic reform within the Church of England. This book, a sequel to "Men, Money and the Ministry" (1937), is written by a group of clergy who believe that, in the words of the Bishop of Sheffield's Preface, "unless the Church of England is prepared energetically to set its own house in order, it will not only lose, in a critical hour, an opportunity of leader-

ship, but will also experience the impoverishment of spirit which follows a great refusal."

There are many signs of the growth of the spirit of unity in the sphere of interdenominational cooperation. Under the auspices of the "Sword of the Spirit" movement, sponsored by Roman Catholics, both Roman and non-Roman Christians, (including Archbishops and Bishops), have stood upon the same platform and faced a common task. It seems to take a worldwide conflagration to make Christians realize that the things upon which as Christians they agree are more important than the things upon which they disagree. In the sphere of religious education, there is a fair chance that a century of denominational quarreling will be forgotten and that a common policy of religious instruction, agreed upon by the (non-Roman) churches, will be jointly submitted to the Board of Education with a reasonable hope of its acceptance. The different denominations have shared their buildings or their services with congregations which have been bombed out. A countryman in our village, where the Free Church has been demolished by a bomb, said to me after a "united service" in the fourteenth century parish church, that it seemed odd that it should take a world-war to make the Christians of the village pray together. Times of war may indeed become times of reformation!

Just as war has deepened the sense of interdenominational fellowship, so has it also brought to many a new realization of the ecumenical nature and task of the worldwide Church. At the beginning of the war we used to hear grave predictions of the likelihood of a split between pacifist and non-pacifist

Christians, perhaps even the secession of a pacifist "denomination." But the event has taught us, through the mercy of God, what theologians are constantly tempted to forget, that the unity of the Spirit is something much deeper than the unity of opinion. And it has also been proved that pacifist and non-pacifist Christians can work together in the sphere of Christian action, which is the necessary complement of the sphere of things spiritual. The work of the "Commission of the Churches for International Friendship and Social Responsibility" and its associated informal groups, composed of pacifist and non-pacifist Christians of different denominations, is doing valuable work along these lines: it is thinking out statements dealing with questions of post-war reconstruction, of social and international justice, which, it is hoped, will give a lead to the Christian conscience, and gradually gather behind it a strong and well-informed body of public opinion to voice the demand for justice in peace-making and social rebuilding. It has issued popular leaflets (e.g., "Towards a Christian Britain," "Foundations of Peace," "Advice to Christian Fellowship Groups," obtainable from the Secretary, 21, Meadow Way Green, Letchworth, Herts), and it is undertaking a new form of community evangelism in the Religion and Life Weeks which it has held or is planning in places like Bristol, Bolton, Harrow, or St. Albans. It is hoped that there may come into being a new school of evangelism, adequate to our times, which will carry the Gospel to the heart of the nation's life.

Christian leaders cannot fairly be accused of not having given a lead in the matter of the serious examination

of the world and its problems in the light of the Christian faith. Dr. J. H. Oldham's "Christian News-Letter" is having a wide influence upon thoughtful people; such books as the Archbishop of York's "Hope of a New World" (S.C.M. Press), the Bishop of Chichester's "Christianity and the International Order" (Penguin), or Dr. William Paton's "The Church and the New Order" (S.C.M. Press) are outstanding illustrations of the vitality of the Christian faith as it confronts the graver issues of the world over which it claims to have the victory.

The Christian faith speaks to us of judgment and mercy, not as abstract ideas, but as concrete situations upon the plane of history. In war-time it is easy enough to see the aspect of judgment; I need only stroll down to the village and look at the remains of the ruined church to study the perfect symbol of God's verdict upon Europe; one cannot help asking, as one passes through a blitzed area which had once been the home of living men and women, whether they were "sinners above all men" that such a fate should have overtaken them. And the answer comes relentlessly: "I tell you Nay, but unless you repent you shall all likewise perish." It requires faith to discern the mercy of God in the historical events of our times; but it seems to many of us the birth of the ecumenical church is God's answer, God's forgiving word, His mercy made manifest, to those whose eye of faith is undimmed. Perhaps the Churches, as many suppose, like the old pre-war order, are coming to an end, in the form in which we have known them in the past; perhaps the ruined Gothic arches of ancient churches, or the derelict walls of many

a local Bethel, are the symbol of the closing of a chapter, the outward and visible marks of the dying churches. But the closing of the chapter is not the end of the story; God's verdict on what we have been is in His mercy an acquittal of what we are, and out of

the dying churches the Church is being born. What an opportunity lies before the architect of the new Cathedral of Coventry; what a song of thankfulness in stone he has to compose in praise of Him who, though He chastens, never withdraws His mercy from us.

INDUSTRY UNDER CHANGE

By W. G. SYMONS

The crucial issue for the Christian in surveying the social scene is that of *power*; it arises directly out of the dual insight of the Christian religion into the nature of man, who is both a child of God and a sinner. Social power must be wielded by sinful men who are always tempted to use it in ways that degrade themselves, and those over whom it is exercised to a level unworthy of their divine sonship. Yet the problem is inescapable, for the exercise of and submission to power is of the essence of social life.

The complexities of Christian social judgments spring, from not so much any complexity of the central problem, as from the complex manifestations of power in society. The crucial question is fairly simple; it is "how may social power be organized, exercised and controlled so that it may be wielded with relative safety by sinful men?" If our judgments are to be realistic, we must not merely indulge in abstract generalizations about the peaks of power; we must apply our criteria to the lower levels as well—we must consider the powers of foreman and Trade Union Secretary as well as those of President and Prime Minister.

Industry in Great Britain, as in most countries, is undergoing rapid change at the present time. In this short article no attempt can be made to deal adequately either with the war-time organization of industry or the conditions obtaining within it; what is intended is to draw out certain clear organizational trends—patent even to

a superficial observer—and to invite the lessons which can be learned from judgment on their significance and on them.

Present day industrial developments are not isolated war phenomena. They take their place among the general movement of industrial organization over the first half of the present century—a movement from "liberal capitalism" to "controlled capitalism." There has been a steady increase in legislation regulating industry and the setting up of Government authorities with limited discretionary power over industrial activities—e.g. Traffic Commissioners and licensing authorities. Employers' Associations have increased in strength and scope, so that many industrial decisions are now made, not by individual firms working in competition, but by firms acting collectively. These arrangements were at first almost all voluntary, but, during the years just before the war, schemes began to appear in which collective decisions of employers were made legally binding on the industry as a whole. At the same time the Trade Unions changed in emphasis from being mainly unofficial "fighting" bodies to officially recognized organizations performing definite functions in relation to government and employers. In certain fields of industry, notably transport communications and power, new forms of semi-public undertaking have been set up—for example, the London Passenger Transport Board and the B.B.C.

The war broke on this somewhat

mixed and transitional state of industry, and it is fairly accurate to say that war-time developments in industrial organization have been in a direction continuing the existing trends. The Government was faced with four main aims (1) to bring about the necessary transference of resources (men, equipment and materials) into new lines of production or into the fighting forces, (2) to increase total production, (3) to maintain a certain standard of welfare among the workers, if only to sustain production and avoid disaffection, (4) to ensure a minimum standard of living for the individual viewed as a consumer. Never for one instant was it thought that these could be achieved by the "natural" operation of supply and demand—that it would be enough for the Government to place contracts and leave it for private enterprise to adjust itself to new conditions. There was a complete break with "laissez-faire", so complete as not even to be a matter for debate. In times of peace private enterprise and the "profit motive" might (or might not) be adequate to direct industrial production into those channels where it was needed; but it was recognized that they could not respond quickly and surely enough to the more rapid and far reaching changes occasioned by war. As a result, nearly every side of industrial activity has been "controlled"—labor supply and transference, building developments, individual consumption, fuel, power, transport. The manager of even a small industrial undertaking is faced with an unending succession of forms to complete, licenses and permits to obtain, telephone calls from Government departments and trade associ-

ations and interviews with "inspectors" and "controllers."

There are two important facts to realize about this scene. In the first place, though it is very different from the capitalism of a century ago, it is still capitalism. The control is of the framework, not of the core of industrial production. Production is in the hands of a multiplicity of private firms managing their own factories. The "controls" may determine many of the conditions under which production is carried on; but the organization of actual production is still in the hands of factory managers appointed by and solely responsible to private firms. There are certain exceptions to this—namely the Crown factories and certain "controlled establishments", in which Government control impinges on the actual management. But these exceptions, though of increasing extent, still form a relatively small part of the whole industrial picture.

In the second place, control is not simply "Civil Service control." In some cases the Government has used the machinery of the existing employers association for administering the control. Quite frequently the employers' association and Trade Unions are invited to work out voluntarily a scheme which will then become legally binding on the trade as a whole. Even where the new controllers are directly appointed by the Government, it is usual for them to be appointed "from the trade."

Along with these changes, the Trade Unions have gained greatly increased powers. They have obtained the right to sit on certain controlling committees and have been briefed to safeguard the direct interests of the workers involved and to secure the full cooperation of

these workers in the war effort. More than this, they are participants in the formulation of general policy and the direction of industrial developments in war time, thereby insuring some direction of the real end for which the workers cooperate. This has widened the boundary of Trade Union influence; even in relation to firms which employ no union labor, union consultation is often necessary before official action is taken—and it must be remembered that Trade Union organization is often very weak among women or young persons engaged in repetition work. The tendency has been, in consequence, to strengthen the full-time Union official and the upper ranks of the "Trade Union hierarchy" in comparison with the rank and file member. Trade Union participation has brought about an advance in mutual appreciation of ability and industrial competence as between employers, managers and Trade Unionists, as well as added status and responsibility with Government departments. The ordinary Union members have sometimes viewed this cooperation with suspicion. This sometimes leads to a development of local initiative, along the lines of the "shop steward movement" of the last war, and also induces officials to make stronger claims in order to prove to their members that they have not "sold the pass." Moreover, the use in various capacities of ex-Trade Union officials has led to upgrading of the remaining Union officials, which sometimes makes negotiations more difficult because of lack of experience and diplomacy.

There are other features peculiar to the war situation which are fairly obvious. The shortage of labor has increased the bargaining power of the

worker over against the employer. Scarcity of supplies has reversed the role of sale staffs, who are now concerned with rationing goods to anxious customers, rather than endeavoring to force their wares on unwilling buyers. The imposition of a 100% Excess Profits Tax is important, yet its relatively small influence on the actual running of industry is a measure of the long way industry has traveled from "classical capitalism" in which the "profit motive" provided the only initiative and directing force. One result of the Excess Profits Tax is that firms (outside the actual munitions production) are more concerned with future goodwill than with present profits.

There have been many criticisms of the working of war-time industry—some of them relevant and others trivial or contradictory. There are two bodies of criticism which are of little importance for our discussion. In the first place, there were the dislocations and delays which occurred in the early days of the war as a result of the fact that the country had to do two things at once; to reduce its vulnerability to an intensive attack from the air, and to marshal the country's economic resources for a relatively long period effort. The second part of the task, which would have involved a difficult transition anyhow, was made doubly difficult by the first. Much of our industry is carried on by small independent units, impatient of outside control and with no tradition of "keeping in touch with H.Q." To coordinate the resources of these undertakings, and to create a measure of centralized control at a time when most of the office staffs involved were being sent to small towns in all parts of England, when communi-

cations were overcrowded and doubtful, and when workers and officials were being taken for military and civil defense, was an extremely difficult task. In the second place, there are the clamorous, but often contradictory, criticisms of vested interests, small firms which equate their own well-being with that of the nation, managers who dislike filling in forms, proprietors for whom all restrictions are irksome. Many of these have picked on every failure and delay in production as a trick with which to beat the Government and the Civil Service. Some of these criticisms are well-based, but many were answered in a vigorously worded letter recently sent to the Manchester Guardian." The writer pointed out that for one hundred and fifty years "business men" had been running industry and had resisted interference by Government departments. War came and "control" was demanded. Is it surprising, he asks, that the Government has not wholly succeeded, in eighteen months, in removing the defects and anomalies which had developed during the one hundred and fifty years.

There are, however, certain clearly defined difficulties inherent in this form of "controlled capitalism" which merit attention.

(1) There is responsibility in the "framework" but not at the actual "core" of industrial production—in other words, the departmental controls can be the subject of questions in parliament, but the actual management of production, in the factory, is in the hands of managers who are responsible to private shareholders and to no one else. As long as they do not break the law, no one can call them in question.

The overriding powers of the Government in some essential industries modifies this situation, but it is a true picture of large sections of industry, especially where small firms are common.

(2) There may be weakness of local coordination. General economic policy is coordinated on a national and regional scale; but on the spot, in the local factory or productive unit, co-ordination between the conditions set by the various departmental controls is apt to be poor. The only person who can do it is the privately appointed manager of the factory, and he may or may not be adequate to the task. This weakness is partly one that is basic in private capitalism; but it is accentuated by a traditional view of the function and methods of Government departments.

(3) The scope of Government action in relation to industry has normally been seen as "administrative" (with the exception of a few departments like the Post Office or the Crown Armaments Factories, which are engaged in direct production). An administrative department traditionally works by the methods of restriction and the scrupulously uniform enforcement of regulations. For example a Government Department may adopt fuel rationing—it may say "you may not use more than so much fuel"—but it finds it difficult to bring about positive measures (involving perhaps alterations in the size of factories) which would result in the more efficient use of fuel. To achieve this, would involve "managerial" rather than "administrative" techniques. The Civil Service certainly possesses the necessary managerial ability—the operation of the Post Office shows that—but the methods of

working of the administrative departments do not favor it being exercised and the structure of private industry is such as to resist efforts to exercise it. The problem of just how Government action can achieve *positive* coordination in a system of regulated capitalism is a serious one.

(4) A serious feature of this extreme form of regulated capitalism is the extent to which the initiative of the local business man, upon which capitalism normally depends, is dried up. The profit incentive is removed or greatly modified. The factory occupier has a great many of his conditions fixed for him (prices, supplies, hours and wages, labor supply, etc.). He sells his goods, in the main, to the Government, and his market is relatively secure. So he tends to go on running his factory in the traditional way, trying to keep up with the various orders and instructions coming in from all quarters but making little effort to reorganize or to change his methods.

(5) The operation of the "controls" by employers associations or by those intimately connected with "the trade" has the obvious advantage that the "controllers" are intimately conversant with trade conditions. It involves, however, two minor and one major danger.

(a) There is a danger of patronage and "hole and corner" appointments to Government and semi-government posts, reminiscent of the days before the Civil Service Commission.

(b) Some of the business men, though good at their own jobs, are inexperienced in large-scale administration and the intricacies of "red tape" (which for all its abuses, usually exists for some reason). Hence they may be more pernickety than

the worst of regular Civil Servants!

(c) The major risk is that the controls put monopolistic powers in the hands of persons financially interested, or who are closely associated with those financially interested, in the way in which the controls are operated. Trade Union participation may provide some slight check, but the Unions no less than the employers represent those who are *within* the trade, and may consider the interests of the trade rather than those of society as a whole.

These difficulties and weaknesses are not, of course, the whole picture; taken by themselves they would certainly look too somber. The war setting in some ways counteracts them. Personal aptitude and experience matter a great deal in determining how a local factory manager reacts to the war-time controls. The individualist craftsman-proprietor of the old type, who knows everything about the technicalities of his trade, may become completely befogged amid the maze of forms and instructions and lose all initiative from sheer bewilderment. But in contrast, many of the younger managers, especially those with commercial rather than technical training, are showing initiative and conscientiousness in working within the scope of the controls. Modern management involves the use of quantitative methods rather than rule of thumb, and figures necessary for the controls may be an actual help in management. This different reaction of the older and younger management is very obvious in managerial discussions.

The sentiment of patriotism and of "doing one's bit for the country" reduces risks which would otherwise be

inherent parts of the system. Business men will work and organize, although they cannot expect any increase in profits. The "quasi Civil Servants", newly appointed from business to operate the controls, are showing in most cases a keen sense of public responsibility. Monopoly powers are rarely consciously misused for sectional ends. Moreover, the 100% Excess Profits Tax reduces the risk of temptation to exploit monopoly powers.

This brings us to the crux of the matter. We have developed a system of industry which is working, with some creaking but with tolerable success, under war conditions. But where shall we stand when the war is over? The new features of war-time industry will yield very different fruits in a non-war setting, and it is these uncovenanted and unforeseen consequences which will determine in a large measure the character of the post-war world. But there will be no retracing our steps to 1938; simply to remove the controls is out of the question. Will we have the experience and ability to make the necessary adjustments in our methods of control? This concern has been expressed by the British Minister of Labor in these words "This war . . . has forced many of us to come together to find a way out, to find the right way to solve our problems and we must be careful of the reaction—the let-up, as it were—when the fighting ceases."

What can be said on "the problem of the let-up"? Any attempt to forecast the future "after the conflict" must be largely speculation. At this stage it is impossible to say to what extent the present social landmarks will survive the rest of the conflict and its conclusion. Yet, however spectacular political

changes may be, there must be a certain continuity of economic structure, unless, indeed, the life of society comes to a complete standstill. So, to forecast in the field of industrial organization is less a shot in the dark than to make politics forecasts.

At the end of the war there will almost certainly be a reaction against control of any sort. Just as after the last war, there will be an immediate cry "We have had enough of these controls. We endured them loyally during the war. Now let us have done with them and get back to normal conditions." This agitation will certainly be noisy, stimulated by the individualist proprietor for whom control is always irksome. The danger of such a reaction is obvious; it may wipe away good controls as well as bad, and hinder intelligently planned reconstruction. Associated with it may be a reaction against the powers which the Trade Union now wield in organized industry. On the other hand, there is a strong, though not always so vocal, element among the managers and executives who do not view controls as bad and who will support a continuance of control in the interests of "efficiency."

The logic of existing controls, and the way in which they are likely to be developed, is in the direction of "corporate" organization of industry, i.e. a form in which competition is largely eliminated and in which conditions within each trade are in the hands of the producers in that trade, usually organized through employers' associations and Trade Unions. At present, we have an improvised corporate system, which works fairly well under the pressure of war conditions. But when the war is over, there is serious risk that

the controls, if they continue with their present constitutions, may cease to pull together in the interests of the nation, and that each trade may endeavor to corner the spoils for itself. Yet this form of corporate organization not only has the support of those at present in power within industry, but is uncritically accepted by idealists who make "blue prints" for the future. Both the Archbishop of York (in "Begin Now"—a Christian News-Letter supplement) and Sir Richard Ackland (in "Unser Kampf") in so far as they deal with industrial organization assume a "corporate" producer-controlled, industrial system.

Surprisingly little thought has been given to the techniques necessary for keeping producers, in a planned economic system, sensitive to the demands of consumers and the needs of society as a whole. This is simply a problem of the organization and control of power. The producers in an industry—employers and organized workers alike—are a minority who have powers over society, which needs the goods they produce. They are always tempted to use their powers to exploit society either by seeking monopoly prices for their products or by lethargy and stagnation of technique. The medieval craft guilds, much vaunted by certain sections of Christian thought, certainly did not escape this evil. One effective, though somewhat chancy, method of keeping producing groups sensitive to consumers' needs is the play of competition—hence the "trust busting" laws of the U.S.A. If competition vanishes or is seriously reduced, then it must be replaced by "institutional" sanctions—i.e. in some way the producing groups must be made effectively responsible to

consumers and to society outside "the trade." Schemes of "industrial self-government" and corporate organization are open to serious objection at this point.

Ordinary folk, faced with the huge figures of war expenditure, look with some doubt to the future. Their attitude may be paraphrased: "They talk about a better world after war—that's as may be—but whatever happens it will be a poorer world before we pay this lot off. We shall have to tighten our belts and live more simply for a generation." This attitude is based on a fallacy. It is an obvious economic fact that the war must be paid for *now*, by harder work and a lower standard of living; payment can only be put off to the future to a very small extent. And in this fact lies a real danger. Ordinary folk are working long hours, and doing Civil Defense duties in addition, for the sake of the war effort. They will be willing to work hard and give "national service" in the cause of peace; they do not expect ease and plenty after the war. But they may be faced, not with a state of scarcity where all must work hard, but with a state of disorganized plenty where many will be unemployed. And out of frustrated idealism will be bred ill-considered violence and the seeds of Fascism.

The real problem in all this is one of *aim*. At present, the aim of the Government in controlling industry is clear and relatively simple—it is to secure the maximum output of war materials and the preservation of a minimum of "essentials" for the civil population. But the peace time situation will be quite different. There will be an industrial machine capable of producing an

output well in excess of bare essentials. It is one thing to work out priorities among the multiple, but simply related, needs of war; it is something very different to decide priorities of capital and consumer goods, luxuries and exports, in a relatively affluent peace-time situation.

The risk is that policy will be merely improvised. When fighting ceases, the cry for "normality" may lead to a reduction of control. If, after a year or two, unemployment shows its head in any quantity there may well be a political panic in which controls are reinstituted. But controls intended primarily to prevent unemployment involve an essentially inverted aim. Industry exists to meet real needs, not to provide work to do. If the safeguarding of employment is made the aim, then this leads logically to policies like that of "setting folk to dig holes and fill them up again." One of the merits of the war situation is that problems of economics are, for a time, the right way up; they are problems of production and the efficient use of resources, not problems of finding markets and making work.

The arguments of this article lead by different routes to the same conclusion. The actual forms of war-time industrial organization, on the one hand, and the improvisations which may follow the play of political forces, on the other, are likely to lead us to a falsely-based economic system when the war is over—one based on producer interest rather than the needs of consumers.

If these generalizations are correct, there are three immediate issues to which opinion and effort should be directed both during and immediately after the war:

(1) There is a risk of an exaggerated reaction against the war time controls. Obviously some of the controls are badly operated at present; it is easy for well meaning, but ill-informed, criticism to join forces with the under-hand pressure of financial interests and reactionary demands for "freedom for the capitalist." Public opinion may exert a decisive influence in determining whether we have planned reconstruction or chaos after the war.

(2) Careful attention must be given to the methods of appointing the new classes of public servants which will be needed in relation to industry. The classical British Civil Service methods, with a rigid public examination system, may not be directly applicable. But we must not lose sight of the tremendous step forward in public administration which the British Civil Service Commission entailed. Almost anything is preferable to the mixture of jobbery, wire-pulling, nepotism, and "the old school tie" which are apt to arise when appointments to public offices are not subject to strict supervision. "Let us remember that an honest and efficient public service is a rare phenomenon in the world and something of a novelty even in England."

(3) The central importance of keeping our industrial system sensitive to the needs of consumers has been sufficiently emphasized. There is no cut-and-dried method of doing this. Full use should be made of the experience and possibilities of non-profit-making undertakings, controlled by those who use the services which they provide. In Great Britain this means predominantly the Cooperative Movement. Efforts should be made to ensure consumer representation on the various controls.

However much the organization in an industry is in the hands of those within the trade, ultimate control and effective supervision from outside is essential. Methods of open costing or "efficiency audits" should be developed. It should be the determined and continued aim of government to bring to light and remove "pockets" of inefficiency and monopoly profits in our industrial system; and the need to do this consciously and deliberately will be far greater when the immediate pressure of the war is removed.

This article has been concerned with the organization of industry, and not with political tactics or generalizations. The two are obviously closely related. But it is important to realize that there is an inner logic of industrial organization which is apt to take control of the movements of politics. The precise forms in which these problems arise will depend on the course of political and military events; yet they will arise in some form in almost any political and military situation.

RECONSTRUCTION

By MICHAEL DEAN

In a country at war, when most people are living disturbed nights and strenuous days, it is not easy to think clearly about industrial reconstruction, or to survey impartially the thinking and proposals of other people. It is difficult to see things in the right perspective, and many of the facts and tendencies which seem important at the moment, may be proved insignificant by the changes and chances of war-time. Nevertheless, the attempt must be made. The war has not only greatly accelerated many changes in industry; it has also introduced new factors which are likely to hold a permanent place in our society. The Christian, concerned with social justice, must examine these changes, and attempt to see what their effect on the future is likely to be, and what action God requires of him in this changing situation.

What are the reactions of Christian people to present-day industrial changes? What thinking is going on among Christian men and women concerning industrial reconstruction after the war? We can take as our starting point a letter, which appeared in "The Times" of December 21, 1940, and which made a considerable impression. The letter commends the Pope's Five Peace Points, i.e., the right of all nations to life and independence, delivery from the race in armaments and the tyranny of material force, a juridical institution to guarantee the fulfillment of agreed conditions, the adjustment of the real needs and just demands of nations and minorities, and the development of a

sense of responsibility which weighs human standards according to the standards of God's laws. The writers then add five standards by which economic situations and policies may be tested, namely:

1. Extreme inequalities in wealth and possession should be abolished.
2. Every child, regardless of race and class, should have equal opportunities of education, suitable for the development of his peculiar capacities.
3. The family as a social unit must be safeguarded.
4. The sense of a divine vocation must be restored to man's daily work.
5. The resources of the earth should be used as God's gifts to the whole human race, and used with due consideration for the needs of the present and future generations.

(These points arise out of the work of the Oxford Conference of the Churches in 1937.)

The writers of the letter suggest that these ten principles may be regarded as the true basis for a lasting peace. The letter was signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal Hinsley, who is the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, the Moderator of the Free Church Council, and the Archbishop of York, and this unity of outlook on the basis for reconstruction helped to create a strong interest in the various proposals of the letter. Groups in various churches discussed the letter at the time, but religious circles are

slow to move, even in wartime, and it is now, some eight months after the letter appeared, that an increasing number of people see that the principles put forward deserve careful study. In a number of cities large inter-denominational meetings are being planned, in some cases with the warm cooperation of the Roman Catholics, and in the program the ten points of the letter have the major place. It is hoped that these meetings will initiate study groups to consider the working out of the principles in everyday life, and in international life.

One of the more recent events in the field of Christian thought and economic life was the Malvern Conference of January, 1941. At the Conference, which was housed in one of England's most famous schools, in a beautiful setting on the lower slopes of the Malvern Hills, an impressive gathering of Bishops and other higher clergy of the Church of England, lesser clergy, and laity, met together under the chairmanship of the Archbishop of York to discuss "The Life of the Church and the Order of Society." In his address opening the Conference, the Archbishop pointed out the need for a synthesis of knowledge, such as the medieval one, and said that while Maritain has been presenting the synthesis afresh in a form relevant to our time, Reinhold Niebuhr is placing a necessary and complementary stress on the self-centeredness of man. In dealing with the problem of the Church and politics, the Archbishop stated that the Church can develop principles, and individual Christians holding responsible positions can adopt a policy and act, but the Church as a corporate body cannot endorse any one policy for political and

economic life. In subsequent speeches there was considerable confusion regarding the relationship of theology to economics and politics. In particular, it was assumed that the theologian is competent to say, not only what is the true end of man's economic activities, but also to enter the field of theoretical economics and say what economic and financial methods should be adopted in order to bring about a desired result. In view of the large amount of time spent on financial and industrial questions, it was unfortunate that the conference was composed so largely of clergy, and that there was only a handful of people present who were trained economists, or who could speak with a first-hand knowledge of industry. Some of the speakers who dealt with industrial and economic matters appeared to have little interest in the actual changes which have taken place in industry and finance since the war began, changes which are continuing and which are likely to determine to a large extent the shape of our post-war society. Nor did many members of the conference see that many of the changes which they desire can only be brought about by means of the secular organizations in whose province they lie, and that Christian people must work through such organizations if they are to influence events in industrial life. Thus there was hardly a reference to the trade union movement and its influence on industrial and social policy, and apparently the conference did not include many trade unionists or working-class people.

On the whole the Conference consisted of people who were deeply concerned about the manifest contradictions and injustices of our pre-war Eng-

lish life, rather than informed about the relation of Christianity and economic issues. The Conference dealt much more ably with fundamental principles than it did with financial and industrial problems. The members were agreed that the war is not an isolated event, but one symptom of a widespread disease resulting from a lack of conviction regarding the reality of God and the nature of man. In considering the relation of the Church to society, the Conference recognized that changing the individual does not change the social order. It was held that we have now reached a position where man's economic activities have become predominant, as though to produce wealth were man's true end. Where the Conference gave a shock to the prevailing idea, that the Church of England is inevitably conservative or reactionary, was in its attitude to profits and property. The Conference stated that, while it is a traditional doctrine of Christendom that property is necessary to fulness of personal life, where the rights of property conflict with the establishment of justice or the general social welfare, they should be over-ridden, modified, or, if necessary, abolished. Another unexpected action of the Conference was the passing nem con of Sir Richard Acland's resolution that the private ownership of the industrial resources of the community may be a stumbling block, making it harder for men to live Christian lives. The Conference endorsed the ten points put forward by the two Anglican Archbishops, the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, and the Moderator of the Free Church Council. The critical and constructive attitude of the conference came as a wel-

come change from the complacency of so many religious gatherings. The existing industrial system was strongly criticized, though not always on a very well-informed basis. In particular the Conference was uneasy about the profit motive in industry, and the lack of a sense of vocation in the life of the majority of men in industry.

What effect is the Conference likely to have on Christian thinking in England on industrial problems? One thing it has already done: it has made a counter-attack on a dangerous half-truth which is liable to find supporters in any time of crisis, namely, that the Christian is not concerned with social problems, or with the affairs of mankind, but only with salvation from an evil and terrible world. Then the findings of the Conference and various related leaflets are gradually becoming known among a number of church people, and are being used in various study groups. This should result in a valuable encouragement of thought and discussion on social questions. At the same time there is a danger of such discussion being carried on in too theoretical a manner, with little relation to the actual decisions which a Christian has to make in his work, or as a member of some public body. If the Conference is to have any considerable effect, the present literature will have to be supplemented by material of a much more practical nature which will help church members to study together what is required of them as employers, trade union members, or members of local municipal councils or political parties.

The findings of the Conference must be regarded as being of a temporary and stop-gap nature. They in no way

supersede the much more thoroughly considered findings of the Oxford Conference of the Churches in 1937. Malvern suffered from a lack of preliminary study, and the limiting of the membership to Anglicans excluded a number of people who might have made an important contribution. Some of the most realistic thinking, on the relation of Christianity to industrial and economic life in Great Britain, is being done by people who are not members of the Church of England.

A development which is poles apart from the theological and rather doctrinaire discussions of Malvern is taking place among young working-class people in Great Britain. This has arisen out of the Roman Catholic "*Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne*", or Jocist movement, which originated in Belgium. In England this organization has enrolled many young Roman Catholics. The significant thing is that a parallel and slightly different movement is now occurring in the Church of England. In one very large working-class parish on the outskirts of Sheffield a number of young workers, members of the parish church, have formed a "Christian Workers' Union" on similar lines to the branches of the "Jocist" movement. Reports of bad working conditions, young people in unsuitable or unhealthy work, cases of violation of the Factory Acts, and similar concerns of the everyday life of the worker, are discussed and appropriate action taken, usually through the statutory bodies such as the Labor Exchange or the Factory Department of the Ministry of Labor. A number of cases of hardship have been remedied, sometimes with the cooperation, sometimes against the strong opposition, of the employers; but more remarkable

is the spirit of responsibility for the public interest which has developed, and the initiative these young people are showing. The necessity of worship together is stressed, and all meetings begin with instruction in some principle of the Christian faith by one of the clergy of the parish. It is also stressed that, if the Christian worker expects fair treatment from his employer, he has also the duty of doing his best for his employer.

At present this Christian Workers Union consists of two branches in two manufacturing cities. There are signs, however, of the movement gathering momentum rapidly, judging by the number of inquiries which are coming in to the initiators of the first branch, and sections for older men are now proposed. At present the movement is in an experimental and formative stage, and there are many problems to be solved. For example, will the tendency be to take Christian men away from normal trade union activities at a time when the trade unions are in acute need of disinterested leadership, or will men be encouraged to play a more active part in their unions? (The title "Christian Workers Union" is something of a misnomer — the organization is not in any sense a trade union). If the important emphasis on worship together, especially at the Holy Communion, is maintained, can Free Church members as well as Anglicans take part in this movement? And is it possible for Christian employers and managers to be brought into the movement? At present, members are concerned mainly with the day-to-day experiences of life in a works. The broad social issues arising in industry, such as were discussed at Malvern, are so far beyond their range; on the other hand, there is among

ne members a first-hand experience of industry which was lacking at Malvern.

Another center of Christian thought in present day industrial problems is the Industrial Department of the Student Christian Movement. This department works mainly among one important group of people, namely, men in the technical faculties of the Universities, many of whom eventually hold managerial or executive positions in industry. Contact is maintained with these men when they leave the University, and recently the work has extended to include people in a variety of positions in industry. In connection with this, senior work study groups are at work in various centers; these groups have the double function of research into present industrial problems in an attempt to see what action is required by the Christian, and also of educating their own members in economic and social issues. The outlook of many of the people engaged in this work has been strongly influenced by the work of Reinhold Niebuhr. The influence of economic forces in shaping society and conditioning thinking is realized, and it is seen that no solution of social and industrial problems can be reached which will be in full accord with the moral teaching of Christ. The immediate goal to which the Christian should work is justice. In this work the stress has been largely on the need for the Christian to obtain sufficient accurate information about industrial problems before he can decide on what action he will take.

In considering Christian thought on reconstruction, mention must be made of the Commission of the Churches for International Friendship and Social Responsibility. This Commission is at pres-

ent giving considerable attention to economic reconstruction, and is in a position to play an important part in stimulating and guiding thinking on industrial and social matters, both among members of the Church of England and of the Free Churches. The Commission is composed largely of representatives of denominational interests, rather than of men selected for their knowledge of economics or first hand experience of industry, and this is going to make the formulation of any realistic statement or policy on industry difficult. The Commission appears to be unduly influenced by the outlook of the old Christian Social Council, which did some valuable work, though not on present industrial problems. Some members of the Commission talk in terms of a "Charter for Industry" as the right Christian policy, ignoring both the facts of the present situation and the whole historical development of industrial organization and negotiation in Great Britain. The most hopeful sign is that members of the Commission realize the importance of the findings of the Oxford Conference of 1937 in regard to the economic order. The Commission is important because it is in a stronger strategical position for influencing the thought of Christian people on social matters than any other body. The support for a closer understanding and cooperation among the Churches is growing steadily in Great Britain. Among younger people, in particular, there is an increasing realization that they are members of the universal Church because they are members of their own denominations, and the work of the Commission, in its "Religion and Life" missions, and its local interdenominational councils, is

the focus of this new outlook. Because the work of the Commission is becoming so influential, it is important that its thinking on economic and industrial issues should be clear and practical, but it has many difficulties to overcome before it can make an effective contribution to Christian thought in this field.

It will be clear from this brief survey that there is at present little unity in the various pieces of Christian thinking on reconstruction in England. Out of this diversity may come eventually more agreement on the matters which need attention and on the directions in which Christian people should work in social and economic reconstruction, especially as many of the leading people in the various organizations mentioned are well known to each other. The main division comes between two groups. Firstly, there are those who hold that it is possible for Christian people to deduce from their theology, not only guiding principles, but also a more or less detailed scheme of what industry and economic arrangements should be. It is implied that, if this theoretically ideal system is placed before people for their consideration, it is likely to be adopted. Much of the discussion at Malvern, and talk about "Charters for Industry" falls into this group. This outlook relieves its supporters from any investigation of what is actually happening in industry at present, and also from any consideration of the methods, political or otherwise, by which changes in industrial life or economic policy can be brought about.

On the other hand there are those who hold that the Christian approach to industry and economics is to study the situation as it is, to see what Christian principles are contradicted or not

realized, and to seek the help of people with a first-hand experience of industry or an expert knowledge of economics in working for a fuller realization of these principles. This view implies that industrial reconstruction will grow out of industry as it is now. This would seem the more realistic approach, and one which is in accord with the process of development, which has so far been characteristic of industrial life in Great Britain. The first group criticizes this approach on the grounds that it accepts too readily things as they are, and that it will lead merely to a patching up of a bad system, and not to the radical changes in industrial and economic life which Christian belief demands. In fact, the second attitude may be as radical, and far more realistic, than the first. At present neither group has any very obvious influence on major industrial decisions or large-scale policy, though numbers of men who have been in contact with Christian industrial thinking are endeavoring to apply their Christian insights and principles in their own every-day work.

At present the amount of thought which is being given to industrial reconstruction is not large, either in Christian or political circles. The main reason is that so few members of the churches have realized clearly that they have any responsibility for social problems at all, and so, see no reason for the study of industrial and economic questions. Nevertheless, there are many small groups of people who meet for informal discussions and one-day conferences, often at great inconvenience, and often with little accurate information, to discuss the possibilities of reconstruction, and their example is encouraging. There are men in such groups who see that

Christian principles are involved, and who realize that the war has brought about a situation which is plastic and formative, in which much might be accomplished in the sphere of social justice. If the churches, possibly by means of the Commission on International Friendship and Social Responsibility, are able to encourage the study of economic and industrial matters, and to give a

clear idea of the subjects which should be discussed, it may be possible to create a body of informed and influential Christian opinion, with some measure of agreement on the principles on which reconstruction should take place, before the difficulties and temptations, the clash of interests and the divided loyalties, of a post-war world are upon us.

PLANNING AND DEMOCRACY

By EDUARD HEIMANN

The author of "Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction," Karl Mannheim, has acquired wide reputation through his doctrine of the "ideological" character of all knowledge. This doctrine denies the absolute validity of human knowledge on the ground that man sees his world in a distorted perspective, determined by his particular standpoint in life and society. "Knowledge" thus appears as an instrument designed to serve the ends of life, much in the same way as in American Pragmatism, or as a weapon in the class struggle, much as in Marxism. The essential difference is that, to Marx, "ideology" is a derogatory term, since the workers are placed by their historical mission in the possession of the Truth; Mannheim, on the other hand, realizes that all knowledge, including proletarian knowledge, is existentially conditioned and all existence relative. Unfortunately, Mannheim misses the way from this good Christian proposition to the religious nature of true knowledge, as pointed out by Tillich, and believes that a composite picture of the ideologically distorted truths will even out the distortions and give us approximately the full truth. Stranger still, he believes that the intelligentsia, being less strongly rooted in special interests than the economic classes, is in a privileged position with regard to the truth; he ignores the special interests, financial and social, of the intelligentsia.

If man's ideas and aspirations are determined by his social existence, then, in order to attain the desired ideas and

aspirations, we must put him into that kind of social environment which sociology tells us will be productive of them. In this way we will attain a smoothly working social process and "the peace of mind of the individual". (222) The goal is "the planned guidance of people's lives on a sociological basis and with the aid of psychology. (222)

His analyses of recent psychological methods of interpreting and influencing people's behavior are sober and brilliant. Pragmatism appears as the first school to rediscover the unity of thought and action, but proceeds in too "pragmatic" a way without a long-range and systematic view. Behaviorism observes and understands mass behavior without, however, entering into individual motives, and thus leaves the possibility of a gulf between the two. Psychoanalysis is the most thorough approach to individual reconstruction, but so far almost untouched by any knowledge of social sources of individual maladjustment and neuroses. (Part IV) Perhaps still more brilliant are the opposite analyses of social and political institutions as forces in the shaping of people's minds and actions, striving to find outlets for the fundamental drives of man and equilibrium between each other, but also crossing and transforming each other. (Part V) This is well known in the gradual evaporation of the influence of family and other community life; Mannheim broadens the approach to include all other social, economic, and political institutions which circumscribe the possible reactions of people

and determine social selection and prevailing qualities. These are discoveries of great importance and ingenuity; if people are thus being influenced by existing institutions, they should be influenced in a consistent and desirable way.

A planned society has become imperatively needed; the age of laissez-faire is gone. In a society of small organizational units and a high degree of mobility, things could be left to themselves to seek adjustment and equilibrium by action and reaction, pressure and counter-pressure. Now, however, comprehensive social planning and indispensable. Mannheim is far from sharing the familiar exclusive appreciation of economic factors; he stresses the dissolution of standards of behavior through the dissolution of a generally recognized social and moral elite, and the conflict between this disintegration and the centralizing tendencies of the new administrative and military techniques.

He brings out the growing divergence, now increased to the breaking point, between the rationality of these techniques: the strict coordination of all individual measures in a coherent system, on the one hand, and the meaninglessness to which it dooms its individual servants in charge of isolated functions, on the other hand. In democratic society this discrepancy becomes most glaring and intolerable. It cannot in the long run be bridged by the dictatorial methods, by providing the common people with substitute satisfactions of an irrational nature, such as national and racial pride; it must be done in a rational way, by giving them insight into the social and economic process which they serve and offering them tangible gains as the prize of their willing participation. (Parts I and III)

Mannheim's reasoning on the rational-democratic character of his future planned society is by no means clear; but it seems to us it may be understood in this way. The weakness of the dividing line from the dictatorships will also be conspicuous; every communist and fascist will claim for his system those tangible criteria which he claims for democracy.

But it is true that Mannheim is emphatic about democratic freedom above everything else. (Part V) He does not favor a full regimentation of individuals and actions, just as coordination under a coherent social system does not coincide at all with conformity; on the contrary, we should plan for individual differences and for individual freedom and initiative. We should do this not only for moral reasons but also for the long-run effects on social progress. "Planning for freedom" is the program which Mannheim opposes to dictatorial planning. In general one gains the impression that a modified, more egalitarian pattern of capitalistic democracy is the type of society which lends itself most easily to such planning for freedom.

Many of his statements come down to the proposition that, if only the social scientists "correlate the results of their partial observations in order to detect the reason for the maladjustment," all would be well, and man would prove to be good. For he insists several times that "it cannot be said that man has ambivalent impulses We can show exactly at what point the prevailing social apparatus can at one time demand one kind of behavior from its citizens and another at some other." (66) "This social mechanism also regulates the growth and the repression of the rational and irrational elements in the life of

the individual." (65) "It is not because of their unchanging human nature but because they are driven, now in one direction, now in another by the dual nature of the social structure that certain human beings are now calculation creatures who work out their actions to the very last detail, and now volcanic ones who think it right that at given time they should reveal the worst depths of human brutality and sadism." (66) Mannheim continues to adhere to the idyllic belief of the technician that rationality is the ultimate standard of the good. Hence also his complaint that war "occurs because men have not yet learned to take a long range view." (142) How long must the range be in order to avoid war? The trouble is that in the short range of a life-time, war may very well pay the victor — why should he then bother to "learn to take a long range view?"

This is what Mannheim calls social science, in contradistinction to his repeated gibes at those "who believe that this tragic irrationality is due to the eternally evil elements in human nature." (65) In our opinion, rationality is no bar to injustice, simply because it has to do only with means but not with ends; to fight and overcome injustices does not mean to abolish injustice; and, on the contrary, the technical knowledge and achievements which Mannheim has in mind are quite certain dialectically to produce their own corruption and perversion, and especially so when not safeguarded by any spiritual guidance. It should not be necessary to remind Mannheim that knowledge and social science are instruments in the struggle for power.

This argument only brings out the contradiction between the ambition of so-

cial science, as envisaged by the author, and his better instincts. Otherwise how shall the reader understand it, when, having been treated for two-thirds of the book to the doctrine of the plasticity of the human mind, we are suddenly referred to the appreciation of the "organic forces." (268) The idea is that the wise planner, prompted by "more human considerations" than purely technical conceptions (266), will have to have "a thorough grasp not only of the standardized techniques involved, but also of the spontaneous forms which develop in life when it is left to itself." (267) Life cannot be "left to itself," it can only be left by one historical form of social control to another, if we follow Mannheim; it is not "organic," but responsive to social techniques to be valued according to the degrees of their long range rationality.

Mannheim consistently proposes the idea of a unified system of social technique, controlled scientifically. Technicians are always thus obsessed and cannot have their machine large enough; this is the logic of rationalism. But here also his thinking conflicts with his better instincts, as in the following passage: "At the stage of planning freedom can only be guaranteed if the planning authority incorporates it in the plan itself. Whether the sovereign authority be an individual or a group or a popular assembly, it must be compelled by democratic control to allow full scope for freedom in its plan." (378) Now, is that "sovereign authority" to be sovereign or to be put under "democratic control?" And, is this democratic control of the plan to be outside the plan or is it a spurious control, being in turn controlled, alongside of everything else, by the planners? This is an-

other resort to a point outside the system, from which to fetch the water of a spiritual principle in this desert of technique. But he cannot really reach it because his technical principle allows for no exception, and must consequently make the means of democratic control an object of the plan. He is moving in a vicious circle.

In a sense, and with a different technique appropriate to a different pattern of society, Mannheim is an eighteenth century rationalist, with an unbounded belief in the creative power of human reason. Like his predecessors, he is very tight in demanding insight and intelligent action instead of a complacent and often hypocritical resignation in the face of avoidable evils. But his position is much weaker than that of his predecessors on three grounds. First, what they had in mind was human reason; he narrows it down to technical reason, with efficiency — long range efficiency, to be sure — as the supreme systematic criterion. Second, to Voltaire, reason was not a technical but a moral force. And third, Mannheim is also far inferior to Marx. It would be unfair to Marx to say that, as he reduced life to economic problems, so does Mannheim to problems of social technique. For Marx's concepts, whether adequately or not, reflect the full strength and fury of human aspirations and conflicts, while Mannheim traces our sufferings to a defective knowledge of social technique, and expects our salvation from the correct application of the correct technical knowledge.

It has been said by Mannheim's translator that, "the great voices of Western European Enlightenment speak once more" in this book and in its unbounded belief in the creative power of human

reason. But, to Voltaire, reason was a moral force, while to Mannheim, it is merely a technical one. Voltaire's Christian heritage, despite his protest against the Catholic Church, was alive enough to make him deeply pessimistic about the nature of man and the potentialities of a reason dependent on such a frail creature, while Mannheim dreams of producing "the peace of mind of the individual" by scientifically "planned guidance of people's lives". Voltaire lived in an age which carried the long repressed reason to its overdue triumphs, while Mannheim is contemporary not only to unfulfilled demands of reason but also to the pride, corruption, and perversion which feed on intellectual and technical achievements. Nobody has done more to deflate the claim to absolute validity of human reasoning than Mannheim; now he invites us to submit to his sociological imperialism.

That religious and philosophical concepts are realistic and capable of proving their explanatory value must be visible in the gap which their absence causes in Mannheim's thinking. He eliminates the fundamental spiritual problems of man's existence and substitutes for them the study of social behavior in response to various psychological, economic, social, and political techniques. This means that he is utterly innocent, not only of the things which he rejects as supposedly speculative and unscientific, but also of political knowledge. It is the political sphere where the fundamental moral principles regarding the structure of human society are decided upon, once we realize that rationality does not suffice to make agreement appear preferable to victory, and respect for persons preferable to efficiency in using or extinguishing them.

Occasionally, he comes dangerously near to deriving democracy from efficiency. A lengthy argument is summarized in the following way. "The necessity of preventing politics from clogging the wheels of planning . . . makes for equality of opportunity in a planned society. Planning therefore ultimately leads to the spread of democracy in the sense of fundamental equality." (363) This will be a great comfort to Jews, Poles, Czechs, and other objects of Nazi planning. Or, at least, to isolationists and pro-fascists in this country, who insist that Hitler is an instrument of progressive world history in that he establishes a unified planned system, which, despite his personal motives, will gradually become democratized from within. Indeed such a conclusion cannot be fended off in the absence of spiritual standards and political principles.

The political principle which offers an alternative to dictatorial unification under one "sovereign authority" and one plan is democratic pluralism. It comes from Proudhon, the great prophet of the totalitarian menace and the democratic way out, and has been used by a large array of writers in different camps and with different biases, from syndicalism to solidarism, but is far superior to them all. It is the logical alternative to dictatorial unification.

Proudhon seeks to establish an organized equilibrium between the democratic groups, thus guaranteeing the freedom of the individual in the group, to which he makes his spontaneous contribution, securing the freedom of the group through its balance with the other groups, and uniting the groups for all matters of common interest, such as defense, regulation of industrial fluctuations, etc. It does not expect democ-

racy as the result of the insight and long range rationality of those to whom we hand over all power for "planned guidance of people's lives." Rather, it establishes democracy through an alliance, on an equal footing, of the groups interested in it, and gives special representatives of democracy those powers which their special tasks require. We are perfectly mindful of the interlocking of all those tasks but also mindful of the fact that, once we give away our freedom to be administered by others, it is lost to us.

The extent to which Mannheim misses this only logical alternative to dictatorial unification can again be demonstrated in his own words. At the stage of liberalism, he argues, "where an increasing number of isolated institutions fill up the framework of society and where each is allowed . . . to go its own way, the most vital guarantee of freedom consists in playing off these institutions against each other. This is reflected in the political theory of checks and balances . . . Where there is no higher authority to which all lesser powers are subject, freedom can only be guaranteed by a balance of more or less subordinate authorities. At the stage of planning, freedom cannot consist in the mutual control of individual institutions, for this can never lead to planned cooperation. It cannot consist in restricting the powers of the planner . . . freedom can only be guaranteed if the planning authority incorporates it in the plan itself." (378)

The bold proposition that planned cooperation is impossible rests on a confusion of terms. If a spontaneous adjustment and natural harmony in the laissez-faire manner prove antiquated in the age of big organizational units,

this does not disprove the possibility that a deliberately organized equilibrium is the contrary of a spontaneous adjustment.

But it is not a plan in Mannheim's sense either. It is not a technical plan established by an unrestricted authority, but a political program which precedes and includes the establishing of a technical plan and limits its content. According to Mannheim, the political decision simply consists in conferring full powers on the planners (while at the same time saving his soul, but not his logic, by the demand for democratic control over the planners); everything else is technical. According to the opposite view, the political decision consists in finding that combination of special political forces which will bring about their fundamental equilibrium and freedom, and their planned cooperation in all matters of common interest. Here the special composition and content of democracy is the primary concern; the planners are directed to serve it. This is the idea which, Mannheim proclaims, "can never lead to planned cooperation," and he does not even find it worth discussing.

Finally, our own attempt at the solution cannot and must not claim for itself that degree of rational and moral infallibility which Mannheim claims for his. This is an essential point. Mannheim is sure that, once his planners are given full powers, all will be well, since they know how to turn the sadistic instincts of man into creative instincts. The opposite program as sketched above envisages a dual equilibrium, between the founding groups, and between the principles of differentiation and unification, so as to achieve integration through justice. But differentiation may turn into incompatibility, and unification may turn into tyranny. There is no possible guarantee, institutional or other, against such degeneration; it may happen at any time from the first day on. Naturally, this is nothing peculiar to this special program; it is the most general observation in history. The only remedy is the one for which Mannheim's scientific pride leaves no room: the fear of God, that is, the consciousness that temptation is always and everywhere lying in wait, and the stern will to resist it.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHRISTIAN REALISM, by *John C. Bennett*. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York, 1941. \$2.00.

The first chapter of this book sketches the climate of thought in which the subsequent problems are met. The first element in this climate is the Nazi onrush, breaking the last vestiges of the unity of the west and extending political tyranny of the deepest hue. The second ingredient in that climate is intellectual. Here the author mentions Barthianism and states, correctly, that in America it is not followed simply, as a school, as it is in Europe. He holds that America cannot hark back to the Reformation as is done by Barth and others. I agree, but if European thinkers ignore the development intervening between us and the Reformation, American thinkers tend to be ignorant of classical achievements, such as the Reformation, and to begin on too low a level. Lastly, he mentions the empirical temper of American thought. This practical, experience-consulting temper does indeed seem to be America's contribution to theology, but empiricism meaning the observation of sense data, is too narrow a word for it. I should prefer his own word 'realism' here. European Realism was born out of the crisis of Europe, and has a dark mood not found in that orientation toward the world of everyday characteristic of American thought for decades.

Living amidst such a climate the following chapters deal with a number of important problems. There is, first, "God and His Activity." In this material the point of chief importance is

the recognition that God is Lord of History. Historical concern has never been absent from Christian thought, but it very particularly marks our own time, as it did the first period of Christianity. The next chapter, "Man and His Possibilities," grapples with some of the characteristic problems of the doctrine of man. This discussion resolves around two antitheses: first, man as the "Image of God," and as fallen sinner; second, man as individual, and as found in society. As for the first antithesis, the fresh and interesting element is the recognition of man as fallen sinner, a recognition foreign to modern thought. Speaking of the second antithesis, the writer sees that fascism is in part a reaction from individualism. While we disallow the form and fury of the reaction, we must regard it as a judgment on a spurious individualism which roots more in the Renaissance and in scientific atomism than in Christianity. We must all agree with Professor Bennett that the ultimate significance of the individual given by Christianity—plus a defiance of the dictators—alone promise to save the individual from the incredible totalitarianisms of our present time.

The next chapter, "Christians in Society," contains the fine social concern we expect from the author of "Social Salvation." Bennett sees that the breakdown of the West threatens the social emphasis of much modern, and particularly American, Christianity. The failure of our dreams—and illusions—may make us defeatists, and finally swallow up our social emphasis in indi-

dualistic, world-escaping religion. If this were done, we should lose the clue to this catastrophe of judgment, for man's failure to give justice accounts for this tyranny. For this negative reason, at least, we should maintain the social interest of our Christianity. But Mr. Bennett does not believe all is lost and expects to see the social goodness of God in the land of the living. As a result of his interest he labors yet again on ground social-historical concern in the Gospel. The latter part of the chapter is devoted to the chief immediate social problem for Christians, namely, the war. He finds two Christian possibilities. First, the position of the pacifist and, second, that of the man who, while not identifying his cause absolutely with the Divine cause, nevertheless, unhesitatingly and in God's name, supports the cause that is relatively better than its alternative. Ever since his memorable letter to the *Christian Century* some months ago, it is clear that John Bennett stands for the latter view. Quite rightly he finds virtues and shortcomings in each course.

There is a last chapter on Redemption. The first part deals with Christ, and the second with the Church. The author stresses quite strongly the Jesus history, though he admits the difficulties presented by Form Criticism. Besides setting up a definite life and teaching, Jesus also redeemed men through the Cross and Resurrection. Here he inclines to the so-called "moral influence" theory of the Atonement, the cross is the persuasion enabling us (leave our sins), and rejects a more "objective" idea as held by Horton, for example. Finally, he writes about the Church as the instrumentality and the means of redemption. He writes as

one who has 're-discovered' the Church in some powerful sense, as he is also rediscovering the Bible and the Hebrew-Christian tradition in all its historical particularities and, if we may say so, angularities. Here his intimate and useful contact with modern ecumenical movements reveals its influence.

The thing that makes this book interesting to me is that it shows a man who is developing. He acknowledges influences that he is coming to feel more powerfully. Without losing his social concern and 'empiricism' he is more responsive to the Biblical, historical, yes, orthodox, elements of Christianity. If the development continues at its present pace, he himself will one day regard this as a transitional book. If he is still a 'liberal', he is on the edges of liberalism and is the best type of liberalism. But he also has elements which cannot be described as 'liberal'. I am not sure that he has fitted the several elements together, nor that they can be conjoined. He affirms that man is a fallen sinner, which I do not think 'liberalism' does, yet, he has a general view of the course of history which is more akin to liberal optimism than to Christianity's questions about the world that fallen sinners make. Nor do I see how the 'moral influence' theory of the atonement is sufficient if man is marked by the will-bondage of a fallen sinner. If man is created by God and is a fallen sinner, his character is really dual. The 'Image' of God that he bears is corrupted, but it remains. The evil remains also. Man is both good and evil. He is an ambiguous figure. His good prevents his evil from being entire; his evil haunts and hampers his good. This ambiguity is man's fallenness. Everything that he does partakes of this

mixed quality, and every god he serves is an idol. This is the real meaning of 'the demonic'. God is, therefore, against man, his works and his loyalties. Jesus denied the whole system, and in this lies his qualification for Messiahship. This denial is the Cross. This denial involves the denial, in some sense, of the 'Jesus of history'. Christ's self-denial was not a virtue among other virtues. It was the denial of the significance for salvation of every virtue, including the virtue of 'self-denial'. Here is a kind of problem deeper than that posed by Form Criticism concerning the historical Jesus. It is this kind of problem, it seems to me, with which Professor Bennett's position must reckon.

CLIFFORD L. STANLEY.

THE RED DECADE, *by Eugene Lyons*. Bobbs Merrill Co. \$3.00.

Mr. Lyons is the author of "Assignment in Utopia," one of the ablest of the books written by disillusioned American and British correspondents stationed in Russia. Ever since his own disillusionment, he has observed and criticized the tardy confessions of his fellow journalists. He was convinced years ago that Russia was a tyranny, and he does not understand why other correspondents, who saw what he saw, continued to write lyrically about Russia. When Stalin's purges and the Nazi-Soviet pact finally prompted his colleagues to leave the "locomotive of history", Lyons quite rightly asks the question, why they were so slow to confess their real convictions, and why they have made a virtue of remaining loyal to Stalin, when they admit that they had doubts and misgivings for years. His strictures against men like

Louis Fischer, Vincent Sheean, and Ralph Bates are rather unanswerable.

But the "Red Decade" deals only in part with the curious aberrations of our leftist intellectuals. Most of the book is given to an analysis of the history of the Russian dictatorship, of the curious machinations of the communist party in America, including all its changes of front at the behest of the Russian master; of the maze of united front organizations through which the party achieved a larger influence in the country than it deserved. There is a hilarious chapter on Hollywood communism, which furnishes light relief. The book is worth reading, though Lyons is not always fair or just and has rather too simple explanations for complex social and psychological phenonema.

WHOSE WHO

MICHAEL DEAN is Industrial Secretary of the British Student Christian Movement.

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WE ARE NOT DIVIDED, a critical and historical study of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, by *John A. Hutchison*. Round Table Press. \$3.00

This book will of great value to all readers of Christianity and Society. Its author is a member of our Fellowship and has long been active in our councils. But that fact does not prove the value of his book to us. The reason the book is important is that it is more than a study of the Federal Council. It is, in fact, a study of the social ethical conceptions of American Protestantism as revealed in the pronouncements of the Federal Council in the past three decades. Thus, the essential ethical and social attitudes of American Federal Protestantism are analysed, both in terms of their adequacy to the historic situation, and in terms of their theological presuppositions.

When we say that it is "liberal Protestantism" which is scrutinized, we do not mean that the whole of the Federal Council is "liberal". But one of the real contributions which Hutchison makes in his study is his proof that, though the Council included non-liberal evangelicals and many other types of theological thought, its social pronouncements are usually based upon essentially "liberal" presuppositions. Professor Hutchison does not condemn these presuppositions out of hand. In fact, his study is just as sympathetic as it is critical. But he does show how frequently the liberal presuppositions are in conflict with the actual facts of experi-

ence, whether it be the problem of world peace or of social justice which is being considered.

The author's own principle of criticism may be regarded as broadly in conformity with the type of Christian radicalism which the Fellowship of Socialist Christians seeks to embody and express. He recognizes that the views of human nature which are usually implicit and sometimes explicit in Council pronouncements are too optimistic; and that the view of human history which the pronouncements imply is based on the idea of progress. But he also emphasizes the genuinely Christian and creative elements in the Council's attitude toward social problems, and the value of the sense of social responsibility which the Council has consistently expressed.

This is a book which ought to prove invaluable in the reorientation of American Protestant social and theological thought, which the crisis of our times makes necessary and possible.

R. N.

AN ENLIGHTENED CONSCIENCE, by *Irl Goldwin Whitchurch*. Harpers. \$2.00.

This book by Professor Whitchurch is disappointing. For the most part the author seems to be fighting a battle that may have been real twenty years ago, but is now no longer relevant. In what might be called the "stronger" parts of the book he merely elaborates the obvious, and in the "weaker" parts he creates strawmen or misconstrues the position of his imagined opponents.

Like many others, the author is disturbed by what he considers the ethical and political impotence of the church, and his too simple solution is, that all

religion should be based upon morality guided by "an Enlightened Conscience," which is rather naively conceived. The book begins with the obvious statement, "there is no such thing as a right relationship with God apart from a just relationship with men" (p.6), and tries to work out a Christian faith and ethics based upon morality alone. The first task, of course, is to determine just what morality is. Laboriously and without originality Dr. Whitchurch shows that although morality includes morals, it goes beyond them and includes "what I shall call an intentional dimension" (p.90). This involves a lot of things including a "theory of reality", which in turn involves a metaphysics. But the metaphysics grows out of the morality and is entirely dependent upon it.

In establishing his position, the author inveighs against various other possible theories. He points out the dangers of legalism. His attack on naturalism is adequate but not new. He spends a lot of time on Biblical authoritarianism, which he largely identifies with Fundamentalism. In a very brief and cursory manner without ever coming to grips with its position, he dismisses the neo-orthodox authoritarianism. "The measure of authority which the Scriptures possess arises from the degree of light they throw on the universal moral problem" (p.114). The Christian faith must stand on an appeal to an enlightened conscience freed from all other authority. (Theology only leads to a blind alley). However, the life, death, and teachings of Jesus reveal that Reality is a God of Righteous Love (pp. 238-244).

Dr. Whitchurch's closing chapter "What must we do" is pretty thin. In

general there are five things we must do. We must revise our view of the Bible into that of just a source book. We must make our Christian Ethics independent, empirical, and valid. We must Christianize our ministry and moralize our theology, which includes some well chosen words on the social gospel. We must deepen our ideas about stewardship. And finally, and not very surprisingly, we must become true disciples of Jesus. This reveals the degree of profundity or lack of it in the book. Moreover, the book employs a number of questionable generalizations such as: "Among the living religions of the world Christianity rests its claim to superiority on its moral uniqueness." (P.xviii); and "Doubtless the work of conscience achieves its highest distinction in an awareness of responsibility well done" (p.128). In his lengthy attack on Biblical fundamentalism he is fighting a straw man or a corpse. While he makes passing reference to modern attempts to deal with the problem of human sin, the author nowhere comes to grips with the problem and either dismisses his opponents with invective rather than insight, or else misconstrues their real position. Added to this the book is carelessly written; it is not always clear whether Dr. Whitchurch is expressing his own ideas or someone else's, and in many places the antecedents to words and phrases are ambiguous.

W. BURNET EASTON, JR.

CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC
POSTSCRIPT, *by Soren Kierkegaard*, Princeton University Press, \$6.00. Translated by David Swenson and Walter Lowrie.

Here at last is one of Kierkegaard's

most important works. Together with the "Fragments" translated two years ago, it is now possible for American readers to secure a fuller understanding of Kierkegaard's thought at first hand. Space forbids a review adequate to the greatness of this book. In a sense Kierkegaard elaborates a conception of the Christian religion so irrelevant to the social interests, the relation of which to the Christian faith it is the business of this quarterly to explore, that it may not deserve a review here. Nevertheless, the profundities of this great work will do much to dispel what is rapid in current "philosophy of religion." Kierkegaard's strictures against "speculative" thought, and his protagonism of "inward" truth, and the "subjective" approach to the truth, ought to help many a modern Christian to regain appreciation of the real meaning of "faith."

What Kierkegaard is always saying, in brief, is that the philosophers imagine that they can, by taking thought, extricate themselves from the precarious human situation of finiteness and anxiety, that they can achieve something like universal mind. But the real fact is that man is a synthesis of finiteness and eternity, of involvement in nature and transcendence over it, and that he does not escape this paradoxical nature of his existence even in the highest reaches of his "spirituality." To understand this is to think "existentially." To overcome the human situation by faith in Christ is possible only when man despairs of his own efforts to extricate himself from his dilemma.

R. N.

BOOKS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

We commend the following books,

recently published, which deal with various aspects of the international situation. *Pattern of Conquest*, by Joseph Harsch (Doubleday, Doran, \$2.50) is a study of Germany by the former correspondent in Berlin of the Christian Science Monitor. It won't be a best seller as is Shirer's *Berlin Diary*, but it is a very able and honest analysis of the internal conditions of Germany. The author is particularly astute in gauging the immediate strength and the ultimate weakness of the morale of a tyrannically governed country.

You Can't Do Business With Hitler, by Douglas Miller, (Little Brown & Co., \$1.50), the former commercial attaché of our embassy in Berlin, is a useful study of the relation of Nazi trade to Nazi politics and the Nazi plans of world dominion. It is valuable despite the fact that the author has exploited the fame won from the popularity of this book to suggest peace terms which would be as unjust as Hitler's. He would solve the German problem by reducing the Germans to agrarian serfs in an industrial world, thus merely inverting Hitler's own plans for a "new order."

Good Neighbors, by Hubert Herring (Yale Press, \$3.00) is written in the vigorous staccato style of which Herring is the master. It is a judicious and well balanced account of Latin American conditions, and particularly valuable in revealing that the catch words of "democracy" or "dictatorship" are equally unable to describe the complex facts of Latin American political life.

Skeleton of Justice, by Edith Roper and Clara Reiser (Dutton, \$3.00) is a highly documented account of Nazi

justice which reveals to what minimal terms justice can be reduced under a tyranny.

THE DOUBLE MAN, *by W. H. Auden*. Random House, New York. 189 pp. \$2.00.

W. H. Auden would have Dante preside at the tribunal of his writings, and justly; for "The Double Man" is metaphysical poetry in a larger sense than that of the seventeenth century or even "The Waste Land." The wealth of allusions from the sciences and arts as well as philosophy and theology suggests the line of descent from Donne; but there is here no toying with the intellectual "conceit." It is the theme of the poem and its scope, not the mere mode, that is metaphysical. For it seeks to analyze the plight of modern man in this time of crisis, against the background of his spiritual history; and it interprets this plight and man's possible salvation in metaphysical, often strictly theological, terms.

The poetic importance of "The Double Man" has been generally acclaimed. Since the argument is difficult, one may sometimes regret that the weighty body of notes rather multiplies these difficulties and baffles the reader's attempt to discover any obvious architectonic. Such a criticism of modern poetry is always dangerous, however, if not naive. More pertinent to this journal, while Auden does not lapse into preaching at the expense of poetry, he presents man's situation from a point of view closely akin to the theological interpretations of Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr.

The text Auden applies to modern man is Montaigne's statement "We are,

I know not how, double in ourselves, so that what we believe we disbelieve, and cannot rid ourselves of what we condemn." But the old problem is somewhat altered. It is belief in man, the sufficiency of his reason and self-determinism, which is now threatened by disbelief; the reality of sin, which refuses to be denied by the "law" of progress or natural selection; the awareness of a salvation and a knowledge beyond his powers of willing and reasoning, that man cannot escape.

"For however they dream they are scattered,
Our bones cannot help reassembling themselves
Into the philosophic city where dwells

The knowledge they cannot get out of; . . ."

Auden does not give the blue-prints of this city or more than fleeting glimpses of the quality of life therein. His concern is rather to solve the mystery of our present situation by analyzing the spiritual disorders responsible for it, and to suggest how men, while recognizing the ambiguities and relativities of this situation, may "in fact live in eternity." His conclusions are those of a poet, arrived at and expressed independently of any sect or school of thought. Yet, despite the difference of terms, one finds here a profoundly reasoned plea to live existentially.

The New Year Letter, the main body of the volume, considers the problem of modern man from both its negative and positive aspects,—the undermining works of the devil, and the means by which man may nevertheless make his way along a path of relative truth and ascent. Part I, which in introduction defines the function of art and characterizes with a few apposite, epigrammatic lines the poets Auden imagines as his judges, is the most finished section. But what follows is more impor-

depicting those at the end of the
 1930-40 decade as men on a mountain
 in the dark, uncertain which trail to
 follow, Auden imputes to the subtle
 deceptions of the Prince of Lies our
 inability to "learn who and where and
 how we are." Not since Luther has any-
 one except Kierkegaard shown such
 understanding and respect for the
 devil's strategies. Auden exposes him in
 his roles: as the Spirit-that-denies,
 the "first-rate psychologist" who ap-
 proaches his man by way of his tastes
 and prejudices, the past-master of ca-
 nializing truth by identifying it with
 the lie. This last strategy Auden holds
 responsible for the reaction to conser-
 vatism of many who, like himself, have
 become disillusioned in the gospel of
 Christ expounded at Moscow. In true
 herodox tradition, however, Auden
 awards the devil the status rather of
 Milton's Satan than of Mephistopheles,
 claiming his traps are only for the
 "other-ers", and that he is no more
 than the errand boy of the Determined,
 urging men to discover truth by tempt-
 ing them to doubt. For amid his spe-
 cious reasoning they can always find
 the gift of double focus." Again the
 means are different; but in this magic
 trap that enables men to recognize
 half-truths for what they are and is a
 means to light," we have a poetic
 device for the dialectic.

Proceeding in his analysis, Auden
 to the end of the era ushered in by
 the Renaissance, and the discomfiture
 of its chief creation, "Empiric Eco-
 nomic Man." Noting that Blake, Rous-
 seau, Kierkegaard long decried Indus-
 trial Man, he demonstrates how present
 conditions reveal the actual slavery of
 man's flaunted liberty and compel him
 to see in his mirror the "poor, bare,

forked animal" of Lear's mad vision
 and Thurber's cartoons. This last sec-
 tion of the Letter defies any brief ap-
 praisal; for its wealth of insights ranges
 from the Pelagian-Jansenist implica-
 tions of the strife between Jefferson
 and Hamilton, to Wagnerian opera and
 the American literary tradition! Yet
 certain emphases are dominant. Con-
 demning the pharisaism that blames
 statesmen for men's common guilt,
 Auden attributes the present triumph
 of tyranny to spiritual rather than po-
 litical errors. These he traces through
 the double source of Plato's overconfi-
 dence in reason and Rousseau's faith in
 irrational nature, back to the single sel-
 fishness that defines free will as man's
 right to self-realization independent of
 any responsibility to society. Such self-
 preoccupation, Auden affirms, leaves
 man free only to will his own destruc-
 tion; and he defines Hell as the false
 claim to be self-complete, the confu-
 sion of Becoming with Being. In his
 thought "Heaven, where is perfect
 freedom," "the field of Being," is be-
 yond the reach of man's will, attainable
 on earth only in some fleeting, un-
 sought experience. Yet he does accord
 to will the relative freedom of advanc-
 ing towards perfection within time,—
 of gradually struggling upward through
 Purgatory.

The area of freedom Auden grants
 the will closely approaches the Roman
 Catholic position; but this interpreta-
 tion is associated with the distinctly
 evangelical emphasis that man's im-
 perative need in the present hour is to
 admit not merely his creatureliness but
 his guilt. This emphasis culminates in
 the conclusion,

"And all that we can always say
Is: true democracy begins
With free confession of our sins,"

and the closing prayer's petition that our pride be convicted of the offense permeating all our actions, even penitence.

Insisting on the evil inevitably involved in our best-intentioned good, yet avoiding the extreme emphasis on depravity that leads to indifference to civic responsibility and social reform in some Lutheran thought, Auden recommends a truly constructive spiritual and political attitude. He endeavors primarily to define the problem of man today, and indicates no more than the points of departure for its solution. But his analysis of the metaphysical fallacies underlying the liberal view of man and his world, his insistence upon self-examination involving self-conviction, and his suggestion that man's

hope lies in combined contrition for his share in the present social sin and belief in "one immortal one infinite Substance", constitute a profound and challenging appraisal of the spiritual requirements of our time.

"The Double Man" is frequently esoteric. Some of the individual theological interpretations, we lacked space to consider, are questionable. The short couplet may not always seem adequate to the content; and we might wish for a more extended use of the richer verse form of the prologue and epilogue. It is major poetry, nevertheless; like "The Waste Land" a searching portrayal of the mood of a decade, but also prophetic and peculiarly significant for all who would unite Christian faith with social responsibility as defined by dialectic process.

ELEANOR BUSTIN.